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Abstract
This dissertation presents three studies that examine the behavioral phenom-
ena which affect technology adoption in the fields of health and agriculture
in developing countries.
In the first paper based on the joint work with Mary Arends-Kuenning
and Hemant Pullabhotla, I examine whether women’s contraceptive method
choice can be better understood by applying risk compensation theory. This
theory implies that people act with greater care when the perceived risk of
an activity is higher and with less care when it is lower. We examine how
access to emergency contraceptives pills (ECPs) in India affected women’s
contraceptive method choices and incidence of sexually transmitted infec-
tions (STIs). Although ECPs substantially reduce the risk of pregnancy,
they are less effective than other contraceptive methods and do not reduce
the risk of STIs. Using an exogenous policy change, we test whether having
increased access to ECPs leads people to substitute away from other meth-
ods of contraception, such as condoms, thereby increasing the risk of both
unintended pregnancy and STIs. We find evidence for risk compensation in
terms of reduced use of condoms, but none for increases in rates of sexually
transmitted infections.
The next chapter focuses on whether short-run subsidies can promote long-
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run adoption of new technology in developing countries. If so, how large do
subsidies need to be to induce adoption by those who benefit the most from
the technology? Given the large number of subsidies for agricultural and
health technologies in developing countries intended to boost adoption, it
is important to evaluate whether they actually increase adoption after the
subsidies end. We use two rounds of an auction of improved grain storage
technology where access to the technology is driven by random prices drawn
at the household level. This approach lets us disentangle the price paid from
the initial willingness to pay of the recipient, thus allowing us to contrast
the increase in willingness to pay driven by experience with the good to any
reference price effects coming from the initial price paid. Utilizing estimates
on recipients use of the technology, we calculate the benefits of the storage
technology to different farmers and compare that against their willingness to
pay. We then use these detailed willingness to pay estimates to calculate the
welfare effects of various levels of subsidy. First, we find that experience sig-
nificantly increases willingness to pay for the technology in the second round
of auctions. Second, we confirm that the storage technology benefits farmers:
the average farmer recoups the full (unsubsidized) price of the technology in
a single agricultural season. Third, we find those farmers with the lowest
initial willingness to pay benefit the most from the storage technology, im-
plying that a large subsidy would have been needed to reach those users who
derive the most benefit from adopting the technology.
In the final chapter based on the joint work with Kathy Baylis and Hemant
Pullabhotla, I examine whether providing access to storage technology has
the potential to improve food security for smallholder farmers in developing
countries. I study the impact of on-farm hermetic storage technology on
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four dimensions of food security availability, access, utilization and stability.
Postharvest losses during storage manifest in reduced quantity of food avail-
able to households and reduced quality of stored grain, resulting in decreased
household incomes and lower food availability. Improper storage also com-
promises food safety as well as households ability to delay sales until market
conditions are more favorable or to store for consumption during lean peri-
ods. In a randomized control trial in India, we find that access to hermetic
storage bags led smallholder farmers to store for longer duration, get higher
prices for stored grain, substitute consumption away from market sources to
own stock, reduce aflatoxin contamination, and decrease postharvest losses
during storage. The economic cost-benefit analysis of improved storage tech-
nology shows that farmers recover the full, unsubsidized cost of hermetic
storage bags in one agricultural season.
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This dissertation is dedicated to my Dad, Maa, Nana Ji, Naani Ji, and the
memories of growing up in that old house in Lucknow.
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Technology adoption is an important factor in explaining differences in eco-
nomic growth between countries. Economic research suggests that differences
in technology adoption across countries explain the majority of cross-country
variation in total factor productivity. Thus, economists and policymakers
spend considerable resources promoting the adoption of technology in vari-
ous sectors like health and agriculture, among others. Yet, how the diffusion
of new technology would occur among different groups of targeted benefi-
ciaries remains a black box. For example, the adoption of a new technology
may be promoted by subsidizing initial experience but hindered by anchoring
effects around the initial price. Similarly, information campaigns may lead
to the adoption of a risk-reducing technology but mired by compensatory
behavioral phenomenon like risk compensation. Adoption is a complex pro-
cess affected by both socioeconomic and behavioral factors. Therefore, the
overall adoption and net benefits from a technology can be estimated only
by taking into account all of these factors. In this dissertation, I explore
the behavioral phenomena that come into play when a new technology is
introduced to targeted beneficiaries and subsequently, measure the impact of
technology adoption using experimental and quasi-experimental methods.
In the second chapter, I examine if womens contraceptive method choice
can be better understood by applying risk compensation theory 1. This the-
ory implies that people act with greater care when the perceived risk of an
activity is higher and with less care when it is lower. I study how access to
emergency contraceptives pills (ECPs) in India affected womens contracep-
tive method choices and incidence of sexually transmitted infections (STIs).
Although ECPs substantially reduce the risk of pregnancy, they are less ef-
fective than other contraceptive methods and do not reduce the risk of STIs.
1This chapter is co-authored with Mary Arends-Kuenning and Hemant K Pullabhotla.
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Using an exogenous policy change, I test whether having access to ECPs
leads people to substitute away from other methods of contraception, such
as condoms, thereby increasing the risk of both unintended pregnancy and
STIs. I find evidence for risk compensation in terms of reduced use of con-
doms, but none for increases in rates of sexually transmitted infections.
In the third chapter, I explore the potential of short-run subsidies to pro-
mote long-run adoption of new technology in developing countries 2 . I also
study how large do subsidies need to be to induce adoption by those who
benefit the most from the technology. Given the large number of subsidies
for agricultural and health technologies in developing countries intended to
boost adoption, it is important to evaluate whether they actually increase
adoption after the subsidies end. I use two rounds of an auction of improved
grain storage technology in rural India where access to the technology is
driven by random prices drawn at the household level. This approach lets
us disentangle the price paid from the initial willingness to pay of the recip-
ient, thus allowing us to contrast the increase in willingness to pay driven
by experience with the good to any reference price effects coming from the
initial price paid. Utilizing estimates on recipients use of the technology,
I calculate the benefits of the storage technology to different farmers and
compare that against their willingness to pay. I then use these detailed will-
ingness to pay estimates to calculate the welfare effects of various levels of
subsidy. First, I find that experience significantly increases willingness to pay
for the technology in the second round of auctions. Second, I confirm that
the storage technology benefits farmers: the average farmer recoups the full
(unsubsidized) price of the technology in a single agricultural season. Third,
I find those farmers with the lowest initial willingness to pay benefit the most
from the storage technology, implying that a large subsidy would have been
needed to reach those users who derive the most benefit from adopting the
technology.
In the fourth and final chapter of this dissertation, I use experimental
methods to study the impact of a new improved storage technology on food
security of smallholder farmers in India 3 . Postharvest losses during stor-
2This chapter is co-authored with Kathy Baylis.
3This chapter is co-authored with Kathy Baylis and Hemant K Pullabhotla.
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age not only reduce the quantity of food available to households but also the
quality of stored grains, resulting in households receiving lower market prices
and decreased household incomes. Improper storage also compromises food
safety and households ability to store for later sale when prices are higher or
for consumption during lean periods. In this paper, I examine the impact of
improved storage technology on all four dimensions of food security availabil-
ity, access, utilization, and stability. I randomize access to improved storage
technology at the household level using a field experiment with farmers in
India. We find that access to hermetic storage bags led smallholder farmers
to store for longer duration, get higher prices for stored grain, substitute
consumption away from market sources to own stock, reduce aflatoxin con-
tamination, and decrease postharvest losses during storage. The economic
cost-benefit analysis of improved storage technology shows that farmers re-
cover the full, unsubsidized cost of hermetic storage bags in one agricultural
season.
With this research, I hope to add to the current literature on diffusion
and impact of new technology which takes into account various behavioral
phenomena that impact the process of technology adoption.
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CHAPTER 2
CHOOSING PLAN B OVER PLAN A: RISK
COMPENSATION THEORY AND
CONTRACEPTIVE CHOICE IN INDIA
2.1 Introduction
Access to a range of contraceptive methods is an integral part of quality re-
productive healthcare. Given access, the choice between different methods of
contraception may be driven by a range of factors including availability, ef-
ficacy, individual preferences and economic considerations. This paper looks
at how the availability of a new method of contraception impacts the choice of
contraception methods among women in India. More specifically, we look at
whether providing easy access to Emergency Contraceptive Pills (ECPs) re-
sults in substitution away from other available methods of contraception. We
test the theory of risk compensation proposed by Peltzman (1975), discussed
in more detail in section III, which suggests that people adjust their behavior
according to their perceived level of risk instead of actual risk. To understand
potential compensatory behavior in the choice of contraception methods, we
exploit a plausibly exogenous policy change in India that provided easy over-
the-counter access to ECPs in all states in India, except the state of Tamil
Nadu. Using Tamil Nadu as control and neighboring states as treatment, we
employ two empirical strategies a standard double-difference estimation and
parametric difference-in-difference estimator incorporating propensity scores
(PSM-DiD) to test for the impact of this policy change. Our estimates in-
dicate that increased access to ECPs resulted in a substitution away from
some methods of contraception. However, there is no evidence of impact on
the rates of Sexually Transmitted Infections (STIs). We also did not find any
population effects of providing easy access to ECPs, which is a result sim-
ilar to those in Raymond et al. (2007) and Durrance (2013). These results
are robust to multiple alternative model specifications, including limiting the
sample to border districts of the treatment and control states in a standard
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double difference strategy.
To put the research question in context, in the following subsection, we
discuss family planning policies and ECP access in India in greater detail.
The rest of the paper is organized in sections where Section II presents a
review of the existing literature, Section III highlights the theoretical frame-
work of risk compensation as it applies to our research question, Section IV
discusses the data used in this paper, Section V talks about the methodology
and Section VI and VII conclude with a discussion of the results.
2.1.1 Family Planning and ECPs in India: Policy, Need,
Attitudes, and Beliefs
ECPs, or morning-after pills, are a reproductive health intervention to pre-
vent unwanted pregnancy in cases of unprotected intercourse, incorrect use
of contraceptives, or contraceptive failure. ECPs can contain a single or a
combination of hormones that should be taken within a specified timeframe
after intercourse to be effective. When taken within the first 72 hours after
pregnancy, ECPs prevent pregnancy 87 to 90% of the time (Rodrigues et al.,
2001). Effectiveness is lower when used after 72 hours and when used by
overweight or obese women (Glasier et al., 2011). Compared to some other
methods, ECPs are significantly less effective as a regular method of contra-
ception. One study concludes that if an average woman used Levonorgestrel
ECPs for a year instead of her regular contraceptive method, her risk of preg-
nancy would be 20%, as compared to 4% for withdrawal method (Trussell
and Guthrie, 2007; Trussell et al., 2014).
Since their launch in 2002 in India, ECPs have met with mixed reactions
from central and state governments. In 2005, ECPs became available as
over-the-counter drugs in India. To promote their use, the Indian govern-
ment incorporated them in the national family planning and rural health
programs making them available at highly subsidized rates in rural areas.
With prices ranging from USD 0.03 to 0.05 in rural areas and USD 0.35 to
1.60 in urban areas, the ECP sector saw a growth rate in sales of over 245%
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between 2007 and 2010 1. However, in September 2006, the state government
of Tamil Nadu banned over-the-counter sales and any form of advertisement
of ECPs in the state. With major pharmaceutical companies launching an
aggressive advertisement campaign to promote ECP use, the advertisement
and sale of ECPs continued until early 2010 in the rest of the country. In Jan-
uary 2010, the central government placed a nationwide ban on advertising of
ECPs in mass media even though ECPs were still available over-the-counter
and remained a part of national family planning programs for subsidized
purchase in rural areas. In October 2011, the ban on nationwide advertising
was lifted and currently, ECPs are available over-the-counter in all the states
of India except Tamil Nadu, where ECPs are neither advertised nor available
over-the-counter. Figure 2.1 shows the history of ECP availability in India
together with the timing of the policy changes in Tamil Nadu and the data
used in this study.
In addition to being big business for the companies, the use and availabil-
ity of ECPs is also an important issue for womens reproductive health in
India. In nationally representative surveys almost 25% women reported hav-
ing unintended pregnancies (Dutta et al., 2015). Two-thirds of all abortions
in India take place outside the authorized health service facilities (Ahman
and Shah, 2011). This results in the nearly 11 million induced abortions and
over 20,000 deaths from abortion-related complications recorded officially ev-
ery year, which does not include the possibly larger number of unrecorded
abortions and deaths. In a WHO study on sexual and reproductive health,
Grimes et al. (2006) state that around 28% of Indian women reported at-
tempting self-abortion even though abortion has been legal in India since
1971. Recent research provides more persuasive evidence that abortion and
modern contraception are substitutes (Miller and Valente, 2016). With these
statistics and the belief that having greater control over ones reproductive
cycle is empowering, providing easy access to contraceptives is vital. Adding
ECPs to the choice set of contraceptives can help lower the costs due to un-
wanted pregnancies in India.
The launch of ECPs in India was met with opposition unlike any other
1According to shop audit ECP sales data collected by AC Neilsen ORG MARG in 2010.
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method of family planning with objections ranging from behavioral to moral.
Opponents argue that making ECPs available over-the-counter would encour-
age women, particularly adolescents, to choose riskier contraception methods
ones with lower efficacy and no protection from STIs. In this light, we test the
hypothesis that whether making ECPs more widely available results in users
becoming less diligent with their current non-ECP contraceptive method and
lead to a higher incidence of STIs.
2.2 Literature Review
In the family planning literature, research on AIDS prevention and on con-
traceptive method choice examines risk compensation behavior. In the AIDS
literature, one question is how perceived risks of AIDS affect sexual behavior.
Godlonton et al. (2016) examined the impact of a change in the perceived
level of risk on the sexual behavior of men in rural Malawi. In a randomized
control trial, they informed circumcised and uncircumcised men that circum-
cision significantly reduces the risk of HIV infection in men. With this new
information given to the participants, they tested whether a reduction in
the perceived level of risk in circumcised men led to risk compensation and
thus, riskier sexual behavior. They found no evidence that the information
led circumcised men to engage in riskier sex. In addition, they found that
among uncircumcised men, there was a decrease in risky sexual behavior.
Many studies conclude that making ECPs more widely available does not
increase risk-taking or adversely affect regular contraceptive use. Marston
et al. (2005) found that levels of use of different types of contraception by
women aged 16-49 in the UK remained similar after emergency hormonal
contraception was made available over the counter from 2000 to 2002. No
significant change occurred in the proportion of women using emergency
hormonal contraception or having unprotected sex. An interesting difference
between their study and the context of this study was that the percentage
of women using ECPs in the UK decreased each year, a trend which was the
opposite of what happened in India.
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Marston et al. (2005) also examined the effect of access to ECPs on women’s
use of highly effective contraceptives using a representative cohort of French
women in 1999 with follow up to 2004. Their results too suggested that the
elimination of the prescription requirement for ECPs did not promote women
to switch away from more-effective contraceptive use. In a study conducted
in Scotland, Glasier and Baird (1998) also found that making emergency
contraception more easily obtainable did no harm in terms of adverse health
effects and may have reduced the rate of unwanted pregnancies. A study
based in an urban family planning clinic in Pune, India found that advance
provision of ECPs to women did not result in condom users substituting away
from condoms to ECPs. The authors also found that the women given ECPs
in advance were more likely to use it after unprotected sex as compared to
women who did not have access in advance (Ellertson et al., 2001).
The evidence suggesting the contrary - prevalence of risk compensation in
women when ECPs are easily available - is smaller but considerable. Raine
et al. (2000) found in a controlled trial in womens health clinics in San Fran-
cisco, California that women aged 16-24, who received an advanced provision
of ECPs accompanied by education were three times more likely to use it as
compared to women who were only provided education. Although the treat-
ment group did not report higher frequencies of unprotected sex than the
control group immediately after the intervention, women in the treatment
group were more likely than those in the control group to report using less
effective contraception at follow-up compared with at the time of enrollment.
Weaver et al. (2009) explored the attitude and behavior effects in a random-
ized trial of increased access to emergency contraception. They found that
on average, women in the increased access group had significantly stronger
perceptions of the ”relative benefit” of emergency contraception. Women in
the increased access group were also significantly more likely to report that
they had ever used emergency contraception because they did not want to
use either condoms or another contraceptive method.
A more recent study by Atkins and Bradford (2015a) looks at the effect of
changes in policy for over the counter access to ECPs on young adults across
New England states. They found that switching ECPs to a nonprescription
status had no systematic effect on the probability of sexual activity or of
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hormonal birth control use, but that it significantly reduced the probability
that public school students used condoms by between 5.2 and 7.2%. Another
study by Atkins and Bradford (2015b) found that increased access to ECPs
from the national policy change had no impact on risky sexual practices of
women above 18 years of age. However, state-level policy changes were asso-
ciated with an increased likelihood of sex without a condom for women with
multiple partnerships. These results are similar to what we find in this study
wherein easy access to ECPs has resulted in a statistically significant reduc-
tion in the use of other types of contraceptive methods. However, unlike this
study, Durrance (2013) and Mulligan (2016) also find that over-the-counter
access to ECPs led to a statistically significant increase in rates of STI among
both men and women.
While limited research is available on the impact of easy ECP access in
India, some evidence suggests concerns regarding awareness about proper
ECP use. Joseph et al. (2016) study the awareness and attitudes towards
ECPs among college students in India. They found that although over 85%
students had heard of ECPs, fewer than 34% of the total sample knew that
they did not prevent STIs. Almost half of the students interviewed said they
would recommend ECPs to their friends. In an effort to understand the
level of awareness among pharmacists who regularly dispense ECPs over the
counter, Saxena et al. (2016) used the mystery shopper technique and found
that around 79% were unclear about the side effects of ECP use, 86% did not
know whether subsequent unprotected intercourse would lead to pregnancy
and only 16% were able to discuss the risk of STIs when asked leading ques-
tions.
In most studies reviewed for this paper, the use and impact of ECPs were
estimated for women whose access to ECPs was accompanied by education
and in-person counseling for proper use by trained medical professionals.
The women included in these studies largely from urban areas in developed
countries experienced much higher exposure to media and healthcare ser-
vices compared to the Indian women included in the data set analyzed in
this paper. The women who had access to and chose to consult a clinic to
seek contraceptives would also be systematically different from the women
in our dataset who buy it from local pharmacies when ECPs are available
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over-the-counter.
In addition to disparities in information, the Indian women included in
our sample are likely to differ from their counterparts in developed countries
with respect to inter-temporal discount rates and intra-household bargain-
ing power over the preferred method of contraception. The social context
in which most Indian women must navigate their options related to fertil-
ity and contraception is complex. For unmarried young women, the social
cost of failed contraception is enormously high in both urban and rural ar-
eas. Moreover, given the lower intra-household bargaining power of women
in India, fertility decisions and the choice of contraceptives may largely be
driven by the preferences of their male partners who may prioritize personal
pleasure over the choice of most appropriate contraception method for their
partner.
2.3 Theoretical Framework: Risk Compensation
Theory
When Peltzman (1975) proposed the theory of risk compensation behavior
resulting from mandatory automobile safety regulation, it led many social
scientists to look for evidence of similar risk behavior in a variety of fields.
Peltzmans theory suggests that people adjust their behavior according to
their perceived level of risk, acting with greater care when the perceived risk
is higher and with less care when it is lower. If risk-reducing techniques (such
as the use of seat belts) reduce risk to a level that is perceived as low enough
to encourage people to engage in riskier behavior (such as reckless driving),
then the potential net benefits of these techniques might be undermined. The
empirical literature examines behavioral responses to risk-reducing technolo-
gies such as seat belts, bicycle helmets, protective sports gear, sunscreen,
etc. Researchers have also looked at similar risk compensation responses in
the context of HIV and whether a difference in the perceived risk of infec-
tion changes peoples behavior. While choosing a method of contraception,
one may have to similarly evaluate costs and benefits and a gap between
perceived costs and benefits can result in people choosing methods that may
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not be the most suitable for their needs.
We know from past research that the choice of contraception method is
guided by a range of socioeconomic factors, access, efficacy, individual pref-
erences and partnership characteristics (Frost and Darroch, 2008; Trussell
and Guthrie, 2007). However, if there is a significant gap between perceived
versus actual costs and benefits, it may lead to contraceptive choice for users
that might not reflect their preferences. With the increased availability of
ECPs and aggressive advertising campaigns by pharmaceutical companies,
potential users might have an inaccurate perception of the benefits and costs
of using ECPs as compared to other methods of contraception. This may
lead to substituting away from other more effective methods of contracep-
tion, like condoms which are also the only form of modern contraception that
prevents STIs.
Unlike ECPs, regular oral contraceptives require women to take medica-
tion daily. The cognitive costs of following a strict schedule might be small
yet non-zero for women. With the price of oral and emergency contraceptives
being comparable, this small non-zero cost might also become a determining
factor in making the choice between regular oral contraceptives and ECPs.
Following the framework posited by Peltzman (1975), we can think about
risk-taking behavior in this case, intercourse without using regular or non-
emergency contraception as a desirable good that provides some utility in
terms of increased satisfaction, pleasure, thrills, etc. or conversely, decreased
cognitive costs. Thus, the equilibrium will be a tradeoff between perceived
avoidance of (an unwanted) pregnancy and unprotected intercourse, i.e. more
of one can be achieved by forgoing some of the other. If the equilibrium level
of perceived risk to a woman is altered by a risk-reducing technology, she com-
pensates by increasing her willingness to take a higher level of risk. Studies
trying to measure the effectiveness of ECPs (or any risk-reducing technology
for that matter) usually measure the effectiveness without taking into ac-
count the possibility of risk compensation. If people are risk compensating,
the new equilibrium of the optimal level of risky behavior will tend to be
higher than estimated previously. We test the hypothesis of risk compen-
sation in this paper by looking at possible substitution between ECPs and
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other safer, more effective methods of contraception.
2.4 Data
We use three rounds of the District Level Household and Facility Survey on
Reproductive and Child Health (DLHS) conducted by International Insti-
tute of Population Sciences (IIPS) in India. It is a repeated cross-section of
a representative household sample at the district level with round one car-
ried out in 1998-1999, round two in 2002-2004 and round three in 2007-2008.
Each round of the survey covered approximately 600 districts in India with
1000 to 1500 households in each district. This results in a sample size of
over 720,000 households and 644,000 women. Round one and round two in-
terviewed women within the sample households who are currently married,
while round three covered women who were ever married 2.
The surveys are designed to provide information on family planning, ma-
ternal and child health, reproductive health of married women (aged 15-49),
and utilization of maternal and child healthcare services at the district level
for India. In addition, the surveys also provide information on post-natal
care, health institutions and facilities, and coverage of all maternal and child
health programs at the district level. Divided into three parts, they consist
of a village questionnaire, household questionnaire, and married/unmarried
women questionnaire in both English and the vernacular. The womens ques-
tionnaire consists of detailed questions asked to ever-married women about
awareness and use of contraception methods, including ECPs, and incidence
of STIs among other things, which are of particular interest for the analysis
in this paper.
2In our analysis, we limit the round three sample to currently married women to main-
tain consistency with observations from the previous two DLHS survey rounds.
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2.5 Methodology
The state of Tamil Nadu, unlike all other states, has not allowed advertise-
ment or sale of ECPs over-the-counter since September 2006. The ban has
been enforced with frequent raids, fines and closing down of pharmaceuti-
cal stores 3. Tamil Nadu is bordered by three other states Kerala, Andhra
Pradesh, and Karnataka all of which have seen a significant increase in the
use of ECPs in the past few years. The timing of the Tamil Nadu ban and
the DLHS surveys (see Figure 2.1 for the timeline) give us an opportunity
to estimate the impact of easy ECP access on sexual behavior using the ban
as a natural experiment. We first use a double- difference estimator followed
by a parametric difference-in-difference estimator incorporating propensity
scores (PSM - DiD) as an additional robustness check. We also limit our
sample to border districts to again estimate a double difference and find that
our results remain robust. For this analysis to be valid, two key concerns
would be whether Tamil Nadu is a good counterfactual for the other states
and whether the ban in Tamil Nadu was indeed exogenous and uncorrelated
with any baseline characteristics specific to the state. In the following sub-
section, we present evidence and argue that both these assumptions hold true.
2.5.1 Case for an Exogenous Policy Change
In September 2005, the Drug Controller General of India (DCGI) officially
made the Levonorgestrel-based ECP available over-the-counter in all states
in India, including the state of Tamil Nadu. This was seen as a step towards
promoting womens reproductive rights in India. However, in most states
Tamil Nadu, Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh, and Kerala included fringe or-
ganizations such as Responsible Parents Forum, Swarna Bharat Trust and
some religious interest groups protested against the move. The protest alone
was not enough in any state to persuade the state administration to place a
ban on over-the-counter sale of ECPs. As a result, even though ECPs had
not yet gained popularity, they were easily available in Tamil Nadu until
September 2006.
3Ramalingam, K. (2006, October 10). Morning-after pills seized in Chennai. Retrieved
from http://www.indiatogether.org/otcecs-women
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In March 2006, an ex-official of the Drugs Control Authority of Tamil Nadu
moved the State High Court to remove the then Director of Drugs Control
Authority on the basis that he did not meet the educational qualifications
required for the position 4 . The petition supported the promotion of junior
officials who met the eligibility criteria to the position. In light of support
for the petition from the High Court, the Tamil Nadu State Department of
Health removed the then Director and in June 2006, promoted and appointed
Mr. N. Selvaraju as the new Director of Drugs Control Authority 5 . Among
others, one of the important duties of the Director of Drugs Control Authority
is to issue approval for the sale and distribution of various drugs in the state
and enforce the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 and Drugs and Magical
Remedies Act, 1954 6 . Within a couple of months of assuming office, citing
moral reasons, Mr. Selvaraju placed a ban on over-the-counter sale of ECPs
in the state under the Drugs & Cosmetics Act, 1940 and Drugs & Magical
Remedies Act (Objectionable Advertisements), 1954. Following is a quote
from one of his interviews on the issue 7:
“We are not against women’s rights, but this is a moral concern.
The advertising of this drug will mean that women will think, ’I
can do anything and there is an easy way not to get pregnant’.
We can’t allow such an attitude to grow.”
Against medical information and evidence, he also claimed that ECPs are
in fact abortifacient and not contraceptives and thus, cannot be made avail-
able over-the-counter. We argue that given the circumstances, the change
in the administration of the Drug Control Authority was an exogenous one
leading to the appointment of a supporter of the ban. We use normalized
differences to perform balance tests using key baseline characteristics from
4Subramani, A. ”Plea Seeks Removal of Director of Drugs Control of Tamil Nadu.”
The Hindu. March 26, 2006. Accessed August 12, 2015.
5Babu, Gireesh. ”State Govt Appoints Selvaraju as Drug Controller.” - Pharma People.
June 16, 2006. Accessed August 12, 2015.
6Selvaraju, Thiru ”Department of Drug Control Administration Handbook.” State
Government of Tamil Nadu Right to Information Act, 2005. November 10, 2006. Ac-
cessed August 12, 2015.
7Ravindran, Nirmala. ”Problem Pill.” India Today. November 19, 2009. Accessed
August 12, 2015
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the treatment and control groups and find no significant differences 8. If a
normalized difference exceeds one quarter, estimates from linear regression
methods are classified as being sensitive to the specification.
To further support our claim, we use the first two rounds of the DLHS
data to empirically test the parallel trends assumption and find that there
are no significant differences in the rates of change in contraception use, STI
prevalence and other outcomes between the comparison states and Tamil
Nadu. Finally, we also empirically test for differences in outcome variables
between treatment and control states before the policy change and find no
statistically significant differences, thus lending further credibility to our as-
sumption.
The first empirical method we use to estimate the impact of the policy
change is a standard double-difference estimation for the full sample fol-
lowed by the same estimation for a sample limited to border districts while
trying multiple different model specifications. We then perform a double dif-
ference using propensity score matching to further check our estimates. In
the following sub-section, we outline the empirical underpinnings of both our
strategies along with the underlying assumptions that we need to test for its
validity.
2.5.2 Double difference
Before we perform a standard double-difference estimation, we check the va-
lidity of the underlying assumption of common trends between the treatment
and control states in the pre-treatment period. As an additional robustness
check, we then limit our sample to border districts and perform the same
tests. Given that our assumption about common trends is valid, we estimate
a double-difference regression model of the following form:
Yi,s,t = β0 + γs + δt + β1(Non TNs × dt) + β2Xi,s,t + εi,s,t (2.1)
8We use normalized differences because they are less sensitive to misspecification and
to sample sizes than t-statistics (Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009).
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Here Yist is the outcome variable for individual i in state s in period t.
γs is a set of state fixed effects and δt is a set of survey year fixed effects.
Non TNs is a dummy variable for three states that did not have the ban, and
dt is a dummy for the after (treatment) period. The estimated impact is 1.
We also control for a variety of individual characteristics, Xist, that are likely
to have an influence on the outcome variable. These include years of womans
education, years of husbands education, womans age and age at marriage,
religion, location (rural or urban) and some indicators of household wealth
level (like type of house).
The main outcome variables of interest are rates of contraceptive use and
the incidence of STIs. We restrict the analysis to contraceptives that are
close substitutes for ECPs, for example, condoms, regular oral contracep-
tives, the withdrawal method, and the rhythm or abstinence method. We do
not compare any changes in the use of permanent methods of contraception,
like sterilization, or semi-permanent methods like IUDs, since those are not
close substitutes for over the counter ECPs, which are short term methods
and require no planning, invasive medical procedure or intervention from
trained medical staff.
If ECP use is likely to substitute for other contraceptives, we should see
that the coefficient 1 on the interaction of Non TNs × dt would be negative
in Equation 2.1 with contraceptive use as the outcome variable. Intuitively,
this means that with the increased access to ECPs, fewer people tend to use
other contraceptives as compared to Tamil Nadu. This would be evidence
for ECPs being used as a substitute for other contraceptives like condoms.
Furthermore, if people are risk compensating in riskier sexual encounters,
using the incidence of STIs as an outcome variable should result in a positive
coefficient for 1 in the above estimating equation. This would imply that
compared to Tamil Nadu, the rates of STI increased in the states that had
easy access to ECPs.
We replicate the model using only the observations from border districts in
Tamil Nadu and the adjoining states since these districts are likely to share
many common cultural features that would reduce any bias in the initial
estimates. One of the concerns while analyzing only the border districts of
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these states would be the possible illicit trade of ECPs across the border. It
is important to note that Tamil Nadu faces not only a ban on ECP sales but
also on any advertisement for the product in Tamil Nadu. The ban on adver-
tisement since the launch of the product will affect both the awareness about
and demand for the product. Nevertheless, there is still a possibility of some
spillover between border districts of treatment and control states. If there is
a spillover of information accompanied by illegal sale across the border from
treatment to control states, our results would be an underestimation of the
actual impact of the policy. The results of this estimation are presented in
section VI.
2.5.3 Double Difference using Propensity Score Matching
(PSM - DiD)
We use a parametric difference-in-difference estimator incorporating propen-
sity scores (PSM - DiD) for this analysis. We limit our sample to the border
districts using only the last two rounds of survey data - DLHS 2 and DLHS
3. A number of studies have utilized PSM - DiD estimators, mostly in panel
settings (Mu and Van de Walle, 2007). These studies use pre-treatment vari-
ables to construct propensity scores, and then estimate the impact using a
weighted regression in first-differences (Khandker et al., 2009). However, in-
tegrating PSM in DiD under repeated cross-section setting is different owing
to the fact that we have effectively four groups - treatment pre (G1), treat-
ment post (G2), comparison pre (G3), and comparison post (G4), as opposed
to the binary treatment-control under usual PSM settings.
To implement PSM in this setting we follow the multiple group propen-
sity score weighting methodology proposed in Stuart et al. (2014). Their
method is similar to the Inverse Probability of Treatment Weighted (IPTW)
estimator with multiple treatments. They propose a weighting strategy in
which the four groups are weighted in a manner that reflects the distribution
of the individual covariates in the treatment group in the pre-policy change
period. To do so, we estimate a multinomial logistic model to predict the
group in which an individual observation belongs to a function of covariates.
We use individual age, education, age at marriage, fertility, and indicators for
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rural/urban, religion, caste and housing condition in the pre-policy change
period. We allow for flexible functional forms using the levels of the covari-
ates as well as a mixture of their interactions. The resulting multinomial
model is used to predict four propensity scores for each observation. Fol-
lowing the notation in Stuart et al. (2014), the propensity scores are ek(Xi),
where:









where g is the group to which individual i belongs. By construction, all
individuals in the treatment group in the pre-policy period receive a weight
of one. Individuals in other groups receive weights proportional to how sim-
ilar they are to observations in group 1 relative to individuals in their own
group. We then estimate a DiD weighted linear regression. The results of
this estimation are presented in the following section.
2.6 Results
Table 2.1 presents descriptive statistics for the three rounds of DLHS data
for all the four states used for analysis in this paper. As seen from the table,
a large proportion of the population reports awareness of STIs in the dataset.
The survey asks women if they have heard about STIs, RTIs (Reproductive
Tract Infections), AIDS or HIV and if the answer is Yes to any one of these,
the survey considers them as aware of STIs. Given the relatively high aware-
ness of AIDS owing largely to the efforts of the central government body
National AIDS Control Organization (NACO) the survey registers a high
overall awareness of STIs. We see a modest increase in the share of women
who use any Family Planning (FP) method around 59% in the first round
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to close to 65% in the third round.
One of the limitations of our data is the low rate of ECP adoption in the
timeframe for which data is available. Almost 36% of people in rural areas
and 49% in urban areas report awareness of ECP as a method of contracep-
tion but the adoption rates are much lower. Figure 2.2 shows the percentage
of current contraception use by ever-married women who are not sterilized
and report using at least one method of family planning. In the graph,
traditional methods include periodic abstinence, withdrawal, etc. Female
sterilization remains the leading method of contraceptive used by women in
India. According to the DLHS data, 36% of ever-married women in India
have opted for sterilization. Among the ever-married women who report us-
ing at least one method of contraception, 65% of women reported opting for
sterilization. Male sterilization remains low at less than 1% 9.
We now estimate a standard double difference and to ensure its validity, we
first perform balance tests for treatment and control states using normalized
differences, followed by empirical tests for common trends using the first two
rounds of survey data. Table 2.2, Panel A shows that normalized differences
between treatment and control states are insignificant for variables that are
likely to affect the outcome variables. Furthermore, Table 2.2, Panel B shows
that normalized differences between treatment and control states for the out-
come variables and their subcategories are insignificant in the time period
before the treatment. This further makes the case that before the policy
change, the outcome variables were comparable between the treatment and
control states. Table 2.3 shows evidence for validity of the common trends
assumption, which is crucial for the use of a double-difference strategy. As
shown in the table, the interaction term between treatment state and pre-
treatment period has no significant impact on the outcome variables. This
lends further support for the common trend assumption.
9Table A.1 in appendix presents a summary of reported awareness among ever-married
women on contraception methods from round 1 to round 3 for all four states. Table A.2
of the appendix shows the cross-sectional difference in ECP awareness for the treatment
period. Respondents were not asked about ECP awareness in previous survey rounds.
The cross-sectional regression results in Table 9 suggest that women in non-Tamil Nadu
states had, on average, higher awareness about ECPs compared to the sample of women
in Tamil Nadu.
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Table 2.4 presents results of the double-difference estimation. Our coeffi-
cient of interest is the interaction between treatment states and the treatment
period (β1). We see that when given easy access to ECPs without counseling
for proper use, condom use decreases significantly in the treatment states as
compared to the control state, Tamil Nadu where ECPs are not easily avail-
able. Comparing the estimate to control group mean, condom use decreased
by more than 13% in the treatment states. There is also a statistically signif-
icant decrease in the use of abstinence method, though it is only significant
at the 10% level. Apart from these, there is no significant change in any
of the other outcome variables oral pill usage, withdrawal method or STI
symptoms. This implies that there is some evidence for substitution between
ECPs, condoms and abstinence but none for ECPs and other methods. We
also find that easy access to ECPs has not resulted in an increase in the
incidence of STIs.
As an additional check, we limit our sample to the border districts of the
treatment and control states and perform the analysis again including test-
ing for common trends and estimating the impact of policy change 10 . As
required for a double- difference estimation, the interaction term between
treatment state and pre-treatment period has no significant impact on the
outcome variables, thus supporting our assumption of parallel trends. Ta-
ble 2.5 presents the results of the double difference analysis and impact of the
policy change limiting the sample to border districts only. The decrease in
condom use is still statistically significant with a 10% decrease in the states
where ECP is easily available, also accompanied by an almost 35% decrease
in abstinence method of contraception. Apart from these, we find no statisti-
cally significant change in any other method of contraception or the incidence
of STIs.
As mentioned in the previous section, we now use our second strategy a
parametric difference-in-difference estimator incorporating propensity scores
(PSM-DiD) to do our analysis. Table 2.6 presents a summary of the covariate
10Table A.3 in appendix supports the validity of common trends assumption when the
sample is limited to border districts. For brevity, we present only the coefficient of interest
and suppress the coefficients on other variables in the model.
20
means for observations in each group in the pre- and post-periods as well as
the unweighted and weighted standardized difference in means. The weighted
differences for almost all group-wise comparisons are less than 0.25, indicating
that the weighted sample covariates are balanced across the four groups. This
is crucial for the validity of PSM-DiD. Table 2.7 presents the results of the
weighted regression. For brevity, we present only the coefficient of interest
for each estimation and suppress the coefficients on the other variables in the
model. From column (1), we see that there is a significant overall decrease
in the use of non-ECP family planning methods in the states where ECP
is easily available. Specifically, we find a significant decrease in the use of
condoms, abstinence and withdrawal methods when ECP is available over
the counter. We find no evidence for any change in STI as a result of the
easy availability of ECPs. Comparing our estimates to control group means
to understand the effect size, we find that when ECPs are easily accessible,
the use of overall non-ECP family planning methods decreases by 28%, with
condom use decreasing by around 26%, abstinence by 20% and withdrawal
method by approximately 15%. Our PSM DiD estimates show evidence
for risk compensation in terms of reduced non-ECP contraception use but
provide no evidence for increased risk of STIs.
2.7 Conclusion
Consumer demand models would suggest that a response to reduced risk
would be an increase in consumption of the risky good resulting in a higher
than predicted level of risk-taking by the users. This paper examines such
compensatory behavior in the contraceptive choice among women in India.
We test whether having access increased to ECPs leads people to substitute
away from other more effective methods of contraception resulting in an in-
crease in the risk of both unintended pregnancy and STIs. Using a unique
policy experiment in India, our study finds that easy availability of ECPs
does lead to substitution away from other types of contraception mostly
condoms, abstinence and withdrawal method but has no impact on the
rates of STIs. ECPs are less effective than any other regular ongoing method
of contraception, thus increasing the risk of unintended pregnancies.
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So far there is only limited evidence of the impact of increased access to
ECPs on contraceptive choice in developing countries. Most of this infor-
mation comes from small sample focus group discussions and interviews of
doctors, nurses, pharmacists but rarely users. This study provides one of the
first quantitative analysis of the impact of ECP availability on risk compensa-
tion and contraceptive choice using a large, nationally representative dataset.
As reported by Stillman et al. (2014), in 20072008, approximately 21%
of married women in India reported wanting to space or limit births but
were not using any contraceptive method. The reported demand was higher
among rural, low-income and young women across the country. Given the
widespread demand for contraception and the evidence that easy availabil-
ity of ECPs has not resulted in increased rates of STI among women in
India, making ECPs available over the counter and incorporating them in
the national family planning and rural health programs is a step in the right
direction. This study however, makes a case for governments to sponsor com-
prehensive information campaigns to promote the proper use of ECPs not
as a regular contraceptive but as an emergency one. Given the large number
of unsafe self-administered abortions which account for almost 29% of all
abortions, abortion-related deaths accounting for 9% of all maternal mortal-
ity in India (Stillman et al., 2014), coupled with poor availability of public
reproductive healthcare services and prohibitive costs of private healthcare
services, the public-funded access to safe and subsidized methods of contra-
ception is critical for womens health.
Even though this paper finds evidence for risk compensation, the results
do not justify a ban on ECPs given the lack of evidence for any increase
in the prevalence of STIs. It is vital to stress that even if people are risk
compensating, policymakers do not get rid of mandatory safety regulations.
If seat-belts make one a reckless driver, instead of banning seat-belts, policy-
makers take the approach of educating people to reduce risk compensation
in order to realize the full benefits of the risk-reducing technology. Similarly,
there is conclusive evidence that increased control over ones reproductive cy-
cle is empowering. A ban on ECPs as in Tamil Nadu is an expensive and
unnecessary burden on womens health in an environment where government
fails to provide the required basic public healthcare support to women.
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2.8 Figures and Tables
Figure 2.1: Timeline of ECP availability in India
Figure 2.2: Current contraception use
Note: Data based on sample of ever-married women in DLHS 1 to 3 who are not
sterilized and report using at least one method of family planning
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Table 2.1: Descriptive statistics of main variables across three DLHS survey
rounds
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 Total
(1998-99) (2002-04) (2007-08)
Current age of woman 30.09 30.26 31.95 30.73
(7.40) (7.17) (8.22) (7.67)
Years of educ woman 4.479 8.898 8.452 6.872
(4.87) (3.39) (3.57) (4.62)
Years of educ husband 6.158 9.762 8.706 7.888
(5.17) (3.68) (5.18) (5.08)
Age when started living with husband 17.55 19.31 19.25 18.54
(3.30) (3.50) (3.57) (3.55)
Fertility 2.239 1.901 2.081 2.103
(1.47) (1.14) (1.21) (1.32)
Aware of STI 0.77 0.943 0.943 0.869
(0.42) (0.23) (0.23) (0.34)
Symptoms of STI (past 3 months) 0.245 0.145 0.106 0.175
(0.43) (0.35) (0.31) (0.38)
Currently use any FP method? 0.586 0.635 0.649 0.619
(0.49) (0.48) (0.48) (0.49)
Notes: Each cell reports the sample mean of the corresponding variable. The standard
deviation is reported in parentheses. Columns (1) (3) report the summary statistics for
the three DLHS rounds separately, and column (4) reports the same for the pooled sample
of observations across the three rounds a .
aThe sudden increase in the years of womans education and husbands education from
round 1 to round 2 is due to a change in definition of the variable between the rounds.
However, the definition of this variable remains consistent within rounds and across states
for each round. For our analysis across different rounds, we redefine the variable to account
for this change.
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Table 2.2: Normalized differences between treatment and control states
Panel A: Individual and household variables
(1) (2) (3)
Non-TN TN Norm. Diff.
Current age of woman 28.17 30.41 0.1898
Years of educ husband 7.7 8.18 0.0548
Years of educ woman 7.61 7.78 0.0261
Age when started 18.17 19.48 0.2438
living with husband
Religion
Hindu 0.75 0.87 0.2062
Muslim 0.18 0.08 -0.2108
Christian 0.06 0.05 -0.0325
Other 0.01 0 -0.0454
Caste
Scheduled caste 0.17 0.23 0.1185
Schedule tribe 0.07 0.02 -0.19
Other backward caste 0.47 0.73 0.3618
Housing characteristics
Concrete 0.39 0.37 -0.0304
Semi-concrete 0.43 0.44 0.012
Mud 0.18 0.19 0.0229
Panel B: Outcome variables in pre-period
Condom 0.0373 0.0358 -0.006
Oral pill 0.0152 0.0058 -0.065
Periodic Abstinence 0.0512 0.0397 -0.077
Withdrawal method 0.0299 0.0161 -0.065
Symptoms of possible STI (past 3 months) 0.0735 0.0607 -0.036
Vaginal discharge (past 3 months) 0.1093 0.1908 0.16
Pain during urination (past 3 months) 0.049 0.0369 -0.042
Pain during intercourse (past 3 months) 0.0478 0.039 -0.03
Notes: Col (1) and (2) of both tables report mean values of the characteristics for control
and treatment groups. Col (3) reports the normalized difference (Imbens and Wooldridge,
2009). A normalized difference greater than 0.25 indicates significant differences between
treatment and control. The sample in Panel A consists of all observations pooled across
the three DLHS survey rounds. To test for differences in outcomes in the pre-period, the
sample in Panel B is limited to the observations from the first two rounds of the DLHS
(1998-99 and 2002-04) conducted prior to the treatment period.
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Table 2.3: Test for Parallel Trends Assumption
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Condom Oral pill use Periodic Withdrawal STI
Abstinence method
Non TN X -0.00594 0.00242 0.00206 0.00494 0.00862
Survey Round 2 (0.0046) (0.0016) (0.0082) (0.0105) (0.0055)
HH controls Y Y Y Y Y
State FE Y Y Y Y Y
Survey round FE Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 110529 110529 110529 110529 110529
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses and clustered at state level. Each column presents
the results from an OLS regression with a specification similar to that shown in Equa-
tion 2.1. The sample of observations is limited to the first two rounds of DLHS corre-
sponding to the pre-treatment period. All specifications include state and survey year
fixed effects. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Table 2.4: Impact of Easy Access to ECPs (double-difference estimates
using full sample)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Condom Oral Periodic Withdrawal STI
Pill Abstinence method
Non TN X -0.00475*** 0.00177 -0.0141* -0.0023 0.0113
Treatment Period (0.0002) (0.0013) (0.0058) (0.0016) (0.0153)
Non TN X -0.00896 0.0022 -0.00236 0.00151 0.0208
Survey Round 2 (0.0038) (0.0015) (0.0063) (0.0083) (0.0100)
HH controls Y Y Y Y Y
State FE Y Y Y Y Y
Survey round FE Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 167658 167658 167658 167658 167658
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses and clustered at state level. Each column presents
the results from an OLS regression corresponding to the specification shown in Equa-
tion 2.1. The sample consists of observations from all three rounds of DLHS. All specifi-
cations include state and survey year fixed effects ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 2.5: Impact of Easy Access to ECPs (double-difference estimates
using border districts only)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Condom Oral Periodic Withdrawal STI
Pill Abstinence method
Non TN X -0.00347* 0.00153 -0.0159** 0.00177 0.00678
Treatment Period -0.00143 -0.00118 -0.00335 -0.00106 -0.0242
Non TN X -0.000859 0.00281 0.0217 0.0131 0.018
Survey Round 2 -0.00365 -0.00141 -0.00954 -0.00834 -0.0218
HH controls Y Y Y Y Y
State FE Y Y Y Y Y
Survey round FE Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 48780 48780 48780 48780 48780
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses and clustered at state level. Each column presents
the results from an OLS regression corresponding to the specification shown in Equa-
tion 2.1. The sample consists of observations from border districts from all three rounds
of DLHS. All specifications include state and survey year fixed effects. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.7: Impact of policy change on contraceptive use and STI
symptoms: PSM-DiD estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Non-ECP Condom Oral Periodic Withdrawal STI
FP use Pill Abstinence Method
Non-TN X -0.114*** -0.0156* -0.000068 -0.0803*** -0.0300*** -0.00861
Treatment period -0.0159 -0.00864 -0.00399 -0.00907 -0.00691 -0.00678
Observations 12459 12459 12459 12459 12459 12459
Control group (TN) 0.3986 0.0598 0.0051 0.3931 0.1931 0.0544
mean in pre-period
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Each column presents the results from weighted
linear regression that uses a specification similar to that shown in Equation 2.1 and uses
the weights calculated from predicted probabilities based on multinomial logistic model.
The sample consists of observations from border districts from DLHS 2 and 3. ∗ p < 0.1,
∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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CHAPTER 3
LEARNING BY DOING: SUBSIDIZING
TECHNOLOGY IN THE SHORT-RUN TO
PROMOTE ADOPTION IN THE
LONG-RUN
3.1 Introduction
The role of technology adoption is crucial in explaining differences in eco-
nomic growth between countries. Research shows that a majority of cross-
country differences in total factor productivity can be attributed to the lag in
adoption or inefficient use of technology by low-income countries (Caselli and
Coleman, 2001; Jerzmanowski, 2007). Particularly in the agriculture sector
which employs over 65 percent of the worlds poor working adults technol-
ogy adoption can have a direct impact on economic growth and food security
(Castañeda et al., 2016). However, multiple examples exist of beneficial tech-
nologies remaining unadopted (Kelsey, 2013). In particular, some households
that may stand to benefit the most from a new technology might be least
likely to take it up due to risk, information, credit constraint or other such
market failures (Foster and Rosenzweig, 2010). These arguments have led
to large government subsidies of productivity-enhancing technologies such as
fertilizer, improved seeds, and irrigation. But little is known about whether
large initial subsidies increase sustained adoption after the subsidies end.
Thus, the debate around how to incentivize farmers in developing countries
to adopt new, beneficial technologies is far from conclusive.
Access to credit, insurance against production risks, information cam-
paigns and subsidies or free distribution of technology are among the policy
tools often considered as means to promote technology adoption (Zeller et al.,
1998; Hoffmann, 2009; Giné and Yang, 2009; Dupas et al., 2016). Economic
justifications exist for pursuing these policies under different scenarios. In
cases where adopting the technology has high public benefits (or positive
externalities), it is optimal to invest public funds to subsidize adoption. Ex-
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amples of such cases include vaccinations, deworming, and clean technology
among others. However, research shows that even when private benefits are
higher than private costs, willingness to pay for technology can be very low
(Kremer et al., 2011), and technology adoption does not necessarily follow
(Bryan et al., 2014). Apart from other possible market failures, three major
causes could explain this seeming paradox credit constraints, risk aversion,
and lack of credible information about the benefits of a new technology. In
cases where the target population is liquidity constrained, providing access
to credit has shown large, positive effects on adoption (Feder et al., 1985;
Zeller et al., 1998; Croppenstedt et al., 2003). Similarly, providing access to
insurance can increase adoption of risk-increasing technologies like fertilizer
(Carter et al., 2014). However, when adoption is constrained by the lack
of credible information about the benefits of a new technology, it may be
optimal to incentivize adoption through short-run subsidies. In such cases,
an initial subsidy provides an opportunity for the users to experience the
technology, revise their expectations and adjust their beliefs about the ex-
pected costs and benefits. As a result, the experiential learning gained from
using the subsidized technology and its subsequent diffusion may justify the
cost of the short-run subsidy over time. Conversely, one might be concerned
with large subsidies due to behavioral phenomena like reference dependence
or anchoring (Kahneman et al., 1991; Kőszegi and Rabin, 2006) 1 that might
distort the reference price point, subsequently making people less willing to
pay the full unsubsidized price of the technology, and discouraging adoption
in the long run.
In this paper, we explore how willingness to pay for a novel, beneficial
technology is affected by user experience versus the reference price effects.
We further compare the observed benefit of the technology to the initial
willingness to pay to calculate the allocative efficiency of various subsidy lev-
els. The technology we use for this experiment is improved grain storage
1This type of cognitive bias leads to an anchoring effect where people may use the initial
price point (in this case, the subsidized price) as a standard for future price expectations.
Another related concept is status quo bias (Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1988; Kahneman
et al., 1991), which suggests that people have a preference for the current state, tending to
bias their evaluation of costs and benefits. Thus, users of a currently subsidized technology
may evaluate their costs and benefits relative to their status quo, i.e., the subsidized price
of the technology, and discontinuation of the subsidy may cause disutility and disadoption,
even if the overall benefits exceed the costs.
31
technology which has large potential gains for income and food security, but
that costs nearly seven times more than the storage technology currently in
use. We use a two-stage randomized price experiment using Becker-DeGroot-
Marschak (BDM) auctions to enable us to decouple the competing effects of
experiential learning and reference dependence. Before the first round of
auctions, we provide farmers information about the benefits of the storage
technology for preserving grain quality as compared to traditional storage
methods. Following the information session, all farmers participate in a
BDM auction which allows us to elicit their revealed-preference WTP at the
household level. Based on a price randomly drawn at the household level,
nearly half of the farmers qualify to purchase the improved storage bags. Af-
ter one year, we perform the second round of BDM auction to examine the
changes in WTP of first and second-time (or experienced) users of improved
storage technology. Our results show that farmers who had access to the bags
after the first round have a significantly higher WTP in the second round
for improved storage technology, providing strong evidence for experiential
learning. Conversely, we find no evidence for reference dependence.
We also report results on the impact of using improved storage technology
and find large gains in income and food security in terms of reduced grain
losses due to pests and rodents, lower incidence of toxic grain contamination,
and an increased likelihood of inter-temporal consumption smoothing. Over-
all, we find a positive benefit to cost ratio for most users, even at full market
price of the bag (Shukla et al., 2019a). Because we observe a consistent mea-
sure of the households WTP, we then estimate the allocative efficiency of
different levels of subsidy, and make recommendations about the magnitude
and targeting of subsidies needed to promote adoption to different groups of
potential users. Notably, we find that the people with low and medium ini-
tial WTP benefit the most from adopting improved storage methods. Given
that we find that subsidies that allow for experience of the technology have a
significant effect on willingness to pay, we then ask whether that information
gathered by recipient households is shared to other non-recipient households.
We find no evidence of spatial spillovers in the adoption or willingness to pay
of improved storage technology. We argue that it is because unlike other
technologies such as fertilizers or improved seed use, the benefits of improved
storage technology are experienced privately and thus show no evidence of
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spatial spillovers. Our results illustrate that large initial subsidies for some
technologies can promote experiential learning and increase willingness to
pay for the technology once the subsidy is discontinued.
This paper makes three main contributions to the literature. First, we es-
timate the demand for improved storage technology for farmers who face
potentially large economic and health costs due to the lack of access to
proper storage methods for staple cereals. Smallholder farmers food secu-
rity depends on reducing postharvest losses, getting better market prices for
their grains, reducing toxic contamination of stored grains and being able to
smooth consumption inter-temporally. It is then reasonable to ask what the
demand would be for a technology that could deliver these results. We use
a BDM auction method to directly elicit farmers WTP for improved storage
and find that on average, farmers are willing to pay more than three times
the price of currently used traditional storage methods for the first-time use
of the improved storage technology. However, the estimated WTP for the
technology is still only around 32 percent of its full market price. Our results
suggest that, at least initially, adoption of the technology would be low with-
out a large subsidy. However, when provided a subsidy for first-time use, we
find an increase of around 26 percent in farmers WTP after a year in the
second round of auctions.
Second, we look at the heterogeneous distribution of treatment effects with
respect to WTP to understand the allocative efficiency of different levels of
subsidy. Using the auction design for treatment assignment allows us to mea-
sure not only the impact of the treatment but also the revealed-preference
WTP estimates. We find that groups with low and medium initial WTP
benefit the most from adopting improved storage technology. This is an
interesting result because many economists tend to assume that unlike pol-
icymakers, individuals are aware of their private benefits and costs, and in
the absence of credit or liquidity constraints, farmers who expect to receive
the most benefits should have the highest WTP for the technology. These
results allow us to provide valuable input for technology pricing policies in
terms of magnitude and targeting of subsidies needed to promote adoption
to different groups of potential users.
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Finally, we examine the competing effects of experiential learning and ref-
erence dependence on WTP measures when a subsidy is provided for technol-
ogy adoption. This is an important question for policymakers who often have
to decide between providing subsidies to promote technology adoption and
allocating scarce resources to different welfare programs. Our design allows
us to decouple the effect of experiential learning from reference dependence
to provide useful insights on promoting adoption of any new technology that
may be an experience good. Our results provide strong evidence in support
of the existence of large positive effects of experiential learning but none for
reference dependence or anchoring. These results are similar to the findings
in Dupas (2014) who uses a two-stage randomized price experiment with im-
proved antimalarial bed nets in Kenya, and finds evidence for large positive
experiential learning effects but none for anchoring effects. While Dupas
(2014) uses a take-it-or-leave-it (TIOLI) mechanism to randomize price and
relies on the assumption of random variation in the disease environment, we
make no such assumptions and provide direct estimates of experiential learn-
ing versus reference dependence. Since our design allows us to measure the
full spectrum of revealed-preference WTP, we are able to estimate the rate of
adoption at various levels of subsidy for different user groups based on their
WTP and the benefits they derive from adoption.
Our results inform policies for promoting technology adoption using sub-
sidies, not just in agriculture, but any other field where a new, beneficial
technology may be an experience good.
3.2 Experiment Design
3.2.1 Overview of Storage Technology and Study Area
When poor storage conditions compromise the quality of food grains, farmers
receive discounted prices in the market and lower household incomes (Aggar-
wal et al., 2018). Additionally, the inability to store for own consumption
may lead farmers to sell their grains at harvest when the prices are lowest and
buy back from the market when prices are higher resulting in a loss of income
(Tefera et al., 2011). Previous research has found that improved storage tech-
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nology can have wide-ranging impacts on multiple food security indicators
(Tesfaye and Tirivayi, 2018; Omotilewa et al., 2018; Aggarwal et al., 2018).
Improved storage bags are hermetically sealed, reusable storage bags made of
multi-layered plastic that prevent moisture ingress, fungal growth, and pest
infestation in grain. When used as an inner lining for jute or polypropylene
bags, improved storage bags have been found to preserve grain quality for a
longer duration and to significantly reduce grain damage due to pests, molds,
fungi, and rodents as compared to traditional storage methods (Jones et al.,
2011; Murdock et al., 2012).
In addition to preserving grain quality and quantity, improved storage also
provides health benefits by preventing the infestation of food grains with
toxic contaminants like aflatoxins. Aflatoxin contamination of food grains
is a serious threat to animal and human health (Williams et al., 2004; Bry-
den, 2007a; Shephard, 2008; Hoffmann, 2009; Reddy et al., 2010). Aflatoxin
in food grains is a particularly pressing issue in tropical regions of develop-
ing countries where ideal temperature and moisture make the currently used
traditional storage methods optimal for the growth of aflatoxins. Chronic
exposure to aflatoxins poses a wide range of health risks including compro-
mised immunity, reduced micronutrient absorption, liver, kidney and spleen
enlargement, infertility, low birth weight, stunting, congenital disabilities
and multiple carcinogenic effects (Kumar et al., 2017). Thus, along with
providing market benefits in terms of better grain prices, improved storage
technology also provides unmarketed, and possibly undervalued benefits in
terms of improved grain quality for home consumption.
For our experiment, we use improved storage bags manufactured by Grain-
Pro and available at the market price of approximately USD 1.20 at the time
of this experiment2. At the time of the study, hermetic bags were not avail-
able for sale, and thus their quality and benefits unknown, in any of the
2These are called GrainPro Super bags and have an average capacity of 50 kg (110
lb.). These bags are reusable and the sampled farmers have used it for three seasons so
far. The other option was to use Purdue Improved Crop Storage (PICS) bags which were
significantly more expensive and harder to procure. The GrainPro bags were sold by Pest
Control India Pvt. Ltd. offices in Patna, Lucknow and Delhi. The bags were available
at INR 80 and the exchange rate was approximately USD 1 = INR 66 at the time of
purchase.
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villages in the study area. All of the sampled farmers used traditional jute or
woven plastic bags for storage at baseline3 . GrainPro hermetic bags are not
replacements for jute or plastic bags, but used as supplemental inner linings
for traditional storage bags4.
Our study area covers 1429 households in 42 villages in 5 districts of the
eastern state of Bihar in India (see the appendix for a map of the study area).
According to 2012 estimates, the state of Bihar is the third most populous
state in India. It is also among the poorest, with over 33 percent of the
population living below the government-estimated poverty line (RBI, 2013).
The average annual per capita income of sampled farmers is about USD 230,
and 83 percent of the farmers have less than one hectare of land. Around 90
percent of the cropped area is under food grains with the majority planted
in rice, wheat, and maize. Most farmers store some grains for their own con-
sumption, including landless farmers who receive in-kind transfers for their
farm labor. A total of 1429 farmers participated in the first round of auc-
tions, followed by a sub-sample of 663 farmers in the second round5. The
total number of bags distributed in the study area in both rounds combined
was approximately 3000.
3.2.2 Advantages of Using BDM Auction Mechanism
We use a Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) mechanism (Becker et al., 1964)
as a method of treatment assignment. Multiple field experiments in develop-
ing countries have used BDM auctions to elicit WTP for a new product or
technology (Berry et al., 2015; Banerji et al., 2013; Cole et al., 2014; Guiteras
and Jack, 2014; Kelsey, 2013). The popularity of this direct method to elicit
WTP could be the reliance of other methods such as hedonic valuation and
compensating differentials on the strong assumption of complete markets,
making them unsuitable for use in the context of many developing countries
3Traditional storage bags used in the study area at baseline cost around INR 8 or USD
0.12
4See appendix for the script used by field enumerators to provide information on proper
hermetic bag use.
5We selected one district of our sample to do the second round of auction based on
logistical reasons availability of field staff, willingness of local partners etc.
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(Greenstone and Jack, 2015). BDM auctions are incentive compatible be-
cause whereas the participants WTP affects the probability of whether they
purchase the item, the price they pay for it is orthogonal to their WTP. Thus,
much like the Vickery auction against an unknown bidder or a second price
sealed bid auction, the dominant strategy is for participants to reveal their
true valuation of the product. This design induces individual-level exogenous
variation in treatment assignment based on WTP while providing detailed
data on demand for technology. Briefly, the BDM mechanism operates as
follows: After providing information about the benefits of the improved stor-
age technology, we ask the farmer to state how much they are willing to pay
for a hermetic bag (their bid). Then a random price is drawn from a range
of prices. If the price drawn is lower or equal to the individuals bid, they
buy the bag at the price that is drawn. If the price drawn is higher than the
individuals bid, they do not qualify to buy the bag6.
A key strength of the BDM auction is that for each initial WTP level, the
experimental design randomly qualifies farmers to receive the bags at differ-
ent price points. Thus, it allows us to compare farmers who have the same
WTP but through a random draw, paid different prices to buy the technol-
ogy. This design mechanism allows us to decouple and quantify the effects
of experiential learning and reference dependence. We use a private single-
buyer, single-seller format to individually auction the bags to each farmer7.
Before the auction, the field enumerator explains to the farmer how the BDM
auction works both verbally and by simulation8.
A common critique of experimental technology adoption studies is essential
heterogeneity the plausible idea that when assigned the option for treatment,
those with higher expected gains are more likely to participate (Heckman
et al., 2006). For our context, this would mean that farmers who adopt
the new technology are the ones who expect higher gains from using it, and
take-up depends on unobservable costs and benefits of using the technol-
6See appendix for the script used for auction along with a detailed auction protocol
7The number of bags cannot exceed five per farmer in each round of auctions. We used
this rule to deal with a limited supply of bags.
8We used two small packs of cookies for the simulation and only proceeded to the actual
bag auction once the farmer understood the mechanism because the actual auction can
only be conducted once with each farmer in each round.
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ogy. However, the BDM auction helps avoid essential heterogeneity by only
comparing people at the same revealed-preference WTP level. The revealed-
preference WTP measures the participants expected gains, both observed
and unobserved from adopting the technology. We then compare only those
two groups of participants who have the same WTP for the technology but
only one group was assigned to treatment based on the outcome of a random
draw. In the following sub-sections, we provide more details of our experi-
mental design involving both rounds of auctions.
3.2.3 Field Auction: Round 1
The first round of the study included 1429 households of whom 814 quali-
fied to receive the bags9. These 814 households purchased a total of around
2200 bags. Table 3.1 presents the summary statistics for the baseline charac-
teristics for the sample of households participating in the first round of the
experiment. It also tests whether these baseline characteristics are correlated
with the randomized outcomes of the auction in round 1. We do so by re-
gressing each of these covariates on an indicator for whether the household
qualified to purchase the hermetic bags in the auction along with village-level
fixed effects and bins for each level of WTP (because the randomization is
conditional on the individuals WTP). Column (2) reports the coefficients and
standard errors from these regressions. We cannot reject the null of equality
to zero for almost all coefficients. We also fail to find statistical significance
when all the covariates are jointly tested. In Column (3) we present similar
coefficients for testing the correlation between baseline characteristics and
the price drawn in the auction. Analogous to the results in Column (2),
most of the coefficients are not statistically different from zero. These results
demonstrate randomization was effective. Figure 3.1 shows the distribution
of prices paid for the bags in the first round of the auction. The distribution
of prices in the lottery is skewed to the left to increase the probability of
farmers winning the auction and qualifying to purchase the bags10.
9Our goal was to reach 1500 households but due to the unavailability of hermetic bags
in Bihar and delays in getting them from adjoining states, we had to discontinue the
auctions after reaching 1429 households.
10To increase the probability of farmers qualifying in the auction, without informing the
participants, we added lower value coupons to the pool.
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3.2.4 Field Auction: Round 2
For logistical reasons, we selected one district from our sample to do the
second round of auctions. All 16 villages in the district which participated
in the first round also participate in the second round of auction. Thus our
sub-sample in the second round consists of 633 households out of which 349
qualified to purchase a total of around 800 bags. We check for selection in
the sub-sample used for this round in Table 3.2. We regress an indicator for
round 2 participation on the treatment (qualifying in round 1 auction) and
present the results in Table 3.2. We find that the treatment dummy is not
statistically significant, indicating that there is no selection or attrition bias
in the sample of farmers participating in round 2. Table 3.3 presents the sum-
mary statistics of the baseline characteristics for the sample of households
participating in the second auction round, and checks for balance between
observable characteristics. We find that most of these are not statistically
significant.
3.3 Estimation Strategy
3.3.1 Estimating Change in WTP (from Round 1 to Round 2)
We measure the effect of previously using the hermetic bags on the WTP for
these bags in the next round. To do so, we run the following regression:
WTPround2,i = β0 + β1Qround1,i + µWTP,1 + λv + δX
′
i + εi,v (3.1)
where the dependent variable is the WTP for the bags in the second round
of auctions; Qround1,i is the treatment variable taking the value 1 for individ-
uals who qualified in the first auction round, µWTP,1 are the set of dummies
for the WTP in the first round, λv is the set of village fixed effects, Xi are
the set of baseline covariates used in the previous regressions.
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3.3.2 Estimating Food Security Outcomes
According to the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United
Nations, people are food secure when they “[...] have, at all times, physical,
social and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meets
their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life” (Clay,
2002). With that definition as the guiding principle, we look at the outcome
variables that are most closely related to food security. As in other similar
studies (Omotilewa et al., 2018; Tesfaye and Tirivayi, 2018), we show the
impact of improved storage on grain losses/damage due to molds, pests, and
contamination of grains with aflatoxin. To estimate whether improved stor-
age helped to smooth consumption during the lean period, we look at the
likelihood and duration of storage, share, and quantity of grain stored after
harvest, and source of grain consumption.
To understand the impact of improved storage on food security, we esti-
mate the following equation:
Yi,v,d = β0 + β1Ti + µWTP + δXi + λv + εi (3.2)
where Yi,v,d is the outcome for farmer i in village v and district d. Ti is
an indicator taking the value 1 if the farmer qualified in the auction process
and purchased hermetic bags. µWTP is WTP fixed effects. Xi is a vector
of baseline covariates that are uncorrelated with the treatment. λv are vil-
lage fixed effects (FE). Under this specification, we compare the outcomes
for farmers who qualified for hermetic bags with farmers within the same
village who did not qualify. While this is our preferred specification, we also
show results from regressions without any control variables, and with district
FE and baseline variables instead of village FE. Overall, our results remain
robust to these alternate specifications.
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3.4 Results
Out of the 814 individuals who qualified to purchase the improved storage
bags, 16 (2 percent of the sample) reported not having used any of the bags
when asked in the follow-up survey. All other participants reported using ei-
ther some or all of the bags purchased. The 2 percent that did not use any of
the bags reported selling all their grain at harvest as the reason for non-usage.
The graph in Figure 3.2 shows the total demand at each price point of the
auction by summing up the number of bags demanded by each participant at
each price point. The line at INR 80 represents the full, unsubsidized market
price of the bag. We see a shift in the demand curve from round 1 to round
2, which suggests an increase in demand for the improved storage bags in
round 2.
In the following sections, we provide details of our results on WTP in
round 1, food security outcomes after one year of technology use, adoption
and WTP in round 2 and results pertaining to the allocative efficiency of the
mechanism by examining heterogeneous treatment effects on food security
outcomes. We show our results on the impact of experiential learning versus
reference dependence to make a case for short-run subsidies to promote adop-
tion in the long run. Finally, our results show that we do not find evidence
for any spatial spillovers in the adoption of improved storage technology.
3.4.1 Short-Run Adoption: WTP in Round 1
Table 3.4 shows the WTP for the first round of auctions for both groups of
participants who qualified and did not qualify. As one would expect, the
WTP is higher for the group that qualified to purchase the improved storage
technology. The total WTP is around INR 26, which is more than three
times the price of traditional jute or woven plastic bags that range from INR
6 to 8. However, it is still only 32 percent of the full market price of the
improved storage bags used in this experiment.
We examine the drivers of farmers WTP in the first round of auction by
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looking at the correlation between WTP and a variety of baseline character-
istics. We regress the WTP on each of baseline variables separately, while
controlling for village level fixed effects. Table 3.5 presents these bivariate
correlations. Farmers who have a higher level of education, more sources of
income, higher number of plots and store more varieties of crops are likely
to have higher WTP.
3.4.2 Food Security Outcomes
As shown in Figure 3.3, we find that improved storage has a significant posi-
tive impact on a wide range of food security outcomes. We find that farmers
who had access to hermetic storage were approximately 30 percent more likely
to store and sell grains in the market at a later date. The duration of storage
for treatment group was also significantly higher by around 24 percent. We
also see a significant increase in the share and quantity of output stored after
harvest. Treatment group farmers stored nearly 20 percent higher share of
their grain. We find that even though the quantity of staple cereals consumed
does not change, the source of cereal consumption from own stocks increased
by 26 percent and from market sources decreased significantly by 8 percent.
The likelihood of fungal/rodent damage decreases by almost 99 percent and
the level of aflatoxin contamination reduces by almost 75 percent. We find
that while approximately 38 percent of the grains from traditional bags had
higher than permissible levels of aflatoxin, the number for hermetic bags was
only 4 percent.
We conduct a more detailed impact and cost-benefit analysis of hermetic
storage technology in Shukla et al. (2019a). Our findings suggest that an
average farmer recovers the full unsubsidized cost of improved storage tech-
nology in one agricultural season.
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3.4.3 Long-Run Adoption: WTP in Round 2
Our results suggest a significant positive effect of subsidies in round 1 on
adoption in round 2. As presented in Table 3.6, we find that positive experi-
ential learning effects on farmers who qualified in round 1 lead to a 26 percent
increase in their WTP in round 2. These results are significant and robust
to controlling for household level variables. Recall that these improved stor-
age bags are reusable for an average of 3 to 4 seasons and, ceteris paribus,
it would be reasonable to assume decreasing marginal utility from purchas-
ing more bags. However, these results support our findings on food security
outcomes which show that the likelihood, duration, and quantity of grains
stored for the treated group increases significantly (see Figure 3.3).
We further explore the drivers of the experiential learning effect on WTP
in round 2 by regressing the change in WTP (Round 2 Round 1) on measures
of hermetic bag benefits. The regression model we estimate is the following:
∆WTPi = β0 + β1O1,i + µWTP,1 + λv + δX
′
i + εi,v (3.3)
where O1,i is the outcome variable for individual i measured after the first
round of auctions. The other controls are the same as those used in previous
regression models. The sample used in these regressions is limited to those
who qualified to purchase the hermetic bags at the end of the first round
of auctions. β1 measures the correlation between the benefits derived from
using the hermetic bag and the increase in WTP. The results are presented
in Table 3.7.
Each cell in the table presents the coefficient β1 from separate regressions.
For instance, the first row of the table shows that farmers who had a higher
likelihood of storing rice show an increase in the WTP of nearly INR 2.5
in round 2 over round 1. This increase is about 76 percent of the mean
∆WTP of about INR 3.2 for those who purchased and used the hermetic
bags. Overall, the results in Table 3.7 provide suggestive evidence that farm-
ers who derived higher benefits from hermetic bags are more likely to update
their beliefs about its benefits and show a larger increase in their WTP for
the technology in the second round. These findings strengthen the case that
experiential learning drives higher demand for improved storage technology.
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3.4.4 Allocative Efficiency
The outcome of an allocation mechanism would be considered efficient if no
mutually beneficial transactions can be made in a costless aftermarket. Al-
locative efficiency is usually difficult to estimate in field experiment settings
because the experimenter can observe the price at which a transaction oc-
curred, but not the true valuation (Harstad, 2016). Our experimental design
allows us to observe both the transaction price (i.e., the drawn price) and
the true valuation (i.e., the revealed-preference WTP) at the household level.
The revealed-preference WTP estimates give us an opportunity to measure
allocative efficiency, which is rarely available outside of laboratory settings.
We examine the heterogeneous effect of using improved storage based on
participants WTP in round 1. To do so, we estimate a variation of the speci-
fication in Equation 3.2 in which we interact the treatment variable with the
individuals WTP.
Yi,v,d = β0 + β1Ti + β2Ti ∗WTPi + µWTP + δXi + λv + εi (3.4)
The coefficient on the interaction term in the equation above (β2) mea-
sures the change in treatment effect with an increase in WTP. We estimate
Equation 3.4 for a variety of storage and food security outcome variables
using a continuous measure of WTP. Figure 3.4 plots the coefficient β2 from
separate regressions for each of these outcomes across the WTP distribution
in the sample. Across outcomes, we see a consistent pattern in which the
marginal treatment effect reduces as the WTP increases.
In addition to using an interaction of treatment with a continuous measure
of WTP, we also explore non-linear effects by estimating the treatment effect
across WTP bins. We replicate our main specification from Equation 3.2 by
splitting the sample into three different WTP categories ranging from low
(≤ 20) to high (> 30). The results remain qualitatively unchanged when we
vary these ranges. We present the results of these regressions in Table 3.8.
Column (1) shows the treatment effects for each of the outcome variables for
the low initial WTP group. Similarly, column (2) and (3) show the coeffi-
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cients on treatment variable for the medium and high initial WTP group.
The results in Table 3.8 are consistent with those seen in Figure 3.4. These
results suggest that the average effects of using improved storage are being
driven by the groups with low and medium initial WTP. In other words,
farmers with the highest WTP are not the ones who benefit the most from
the technology. Given the high valuation of improved storage, it is possi-
ble that the farmers with the highest WTP are already investing in some
form of improved storage methods and the marginal benefit from providing
subsidized technology is small for them. This is an important finding for
technology pricing policy. A policy that provides a low level of subsidy for
technology will result in adoption only by individuals with high WTP, who
may not benefit as much from adoption. In such a case, a low level of sub-
sidy might prove to be more expensive than one that provides a high level of
subsidy given the different groups they target. If the overall positive effects
of improved storage are driven by the groups with low and medium WTP,
one may have to design pricing policies that include them in the target group.
3.4.5 Experiential Learning versus Reference Dependence
The added advantage of our experimental design is that for each initial WTP
level, we have farmers who qualify to purchase the bags at different price
points. This allows us to decouple and quantify separate effects of experi-
ential learning and reference dependence. We look at potential anchoring
effects of the price faced by participants in the previous round on their WTP
in the second round by running the following regression:
∆WTPround 2,i = β0 + β1Qround 1,i +
∑
k
γk(Qround 1,i ∗ P kround 1,i) (3.5)
+ µWTP,1 + λv + δX
′
i + εi,v
where P kround 1,i is an indicator taking the value 1 if the price drawn (and
the price paid by those who qualified) in the first round of the auctions is
in the category k. We split the price distribution into three approximately
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equal sized bins defined by the price ∈ 10, (10, 20] and > 20. The results
remain qualitatively similar when we vary these bins. We show in Table 3.9
that the price faced by the participants in round one auction does not affect
their WTP in the second round. The coefficient on treatment (qualifying in
round 1) remains stable and similar to the coefficient found in the regres-
sions without the price terms. We find that the difference in WTP between
those who qualified but faced different prices in round 1 is not statistically
significant. This suggests that the increase in WTP is driven almost en-
tirely by experiential learning, and not by any anchoring effect. This is an
important finding for policymakers trying to decide whether a short-run sub-
sidy, when discontinued, will result in disadoption in the long-run. Instead,
short-run subsidies can provide a much needed opportunity to experience the
benefits of a technology or a product and encourage adoption in the long run.
3.4.6 Spatial Spillovers
We test for potential indirect effects due to spatial spillovers by examining
whether Round 1 outcomes for the neighbors of a participant affect their
own WTP in Round 2. To do so, we estimate the following regression which
includes the measures of Round 1 variables for the neighbors (Nborround 1,i)
variable in addition to the participants own qualification variable.




In Table 3.10, the neighborhood variable that we use are (i) density of par-
ticipants who qualified in Round 1 in Column (1); (ii) the mean neighborhood
WTP in Column (2); (iii) the mean price drawn/paid in the neighborhood.
We use a radius of 250 m around each participant households to define the
neighborhood. On average each household has 15.3 neighbors within the 250
m radius. The results remain consistent when we shorten the radius to 150
m or extend it up to 500 m. The results presented show standard errors
clustered at the village level as well as the Conley standard errors corrected
for spatial dependence (Conley, 1999).
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We find no significant evidence of any spatial spillovers in our estimates
of the WTP in round 2. In other words, a farmers WTP in round 2 is not
affected by the density of neighbors who purchased the technology, WTP of
these neighbors or the actual price paid by them in the previous round of
auctions. We posit that we found no evidence for spatial spillovers because
unlike other technologies such as fertilizers or improved seeds, benefits from
technologies such as improved grain storage are observed privately. Also, the
product was not available for sale in the market, nor did households antici-
pate that we would provide a second opportunity to buy it, providing little
incentive for spreading information in the peer networks.
3.5 Conclusion
Policymakers and scholars often debate the idea that a low introductory
price may potentially cause reference dependence or anchoring around the
price, leading to an unwillingness to pay full price later. Compelling evi-
dence supports the existence of anchoring heuristics, both from laboratory
studies (Kahneman et al., 1991; Simonson and Tversky, 1992; Kahneman and
Tversky, 2013) and real economic situations (Simonsohn and Loewenstein,
2006; Beggs and Graddy, 2009; Abeler et al., 2011). On the other hand,
a second body of evidence suggests that farmers perceptions of technology
characteristics act as a significant driver of technology adoption (Adesina
and Baidu-Forson, 1995; Marra et al., 2003). An expedient way to influence
individuals perception of new technology is to allow them an opportunity to
experience it . Carter et al. (2014) find that consistent with learning models
of technology adoption decision, a one-time provision of a voucher for fertil-
izer and improved seed to farmers in Mozambique led to a substantial increase
in fertilizer use which persisted through two subsequent agricultural seasons.
Thus, the role and importance of experiential learning in technology adoption
cannot be overstated. However, the competing effects of experiential learning
and reference dependence pose a problem for policymakers and practitioners
who often have to allocate scarce resources to maximize social welfare. There
is limited evidence on which of the two opposing effects outweighs the other.
Our research adds to this literature using experimental evidence from a de-
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veloping country context. We find that for a new technology with potential
private benefits, a sizeable short-run subsidy will promote long-run adoption.
Our results suggest that experiential learning from a one-time use of the im-
proved storage technology leads to around 26 percent increase in WTP in
subsequent purchase decisions. Owing to the strength of our experimental
design, we decouple the effects of experiential learning from reference depen-
dence. We find no evidence for reference dependence and strong evidence to
support the idea that the positive effect on adoption is primarily driven by
experiential learning. This is good news for policymakers who might want
to consider providing an initial subsidy to improve adoption of technologies
that may be experience goods. However, the magnitude and targeting of the
subsidy will matter for the overall welfare effect of using the technology. As
we find in our study, the participants who were willing to pay the highest
amount for the technology were not the ones who reaped the most benefit
from adoption. Instead, the participants with a low and medium initial WTP
were the ones who drove the overall positive effects. Thus, a subsidy that is
not large enough to encourage adoption among people with low and medium
initial WTP would not yield the same aggregate positive effects reported in
our study. We should note that our results and recommendations do not rely
on any particular agent to be the subsidy provider. Ideally, if the private
supplier of improved storage technology was large enough, they might find
it optimal to promote the adoption of technology by providing considerable
introductory subsidies.
Recent research suggests that farmers in developing countries seldom take
advantage of inter-temporal arbitrage opportunities in the market due to
credit constraints (Burke et al., 2018). While credit constraints may be one
of the reasons for farmers under-utilizing arbitrage opportunities, our results
suggest that lack of access to proper storage technology is also a part of
the problem. We find that when given access to improved storage methods,
farmers store and sell significantly more in the market than their peers in
the control group. In another paper from the same study area, we conduct
a field experiment to quantify benefits from using improved storage technol-
ogy and find that treatment group farmers not only stored longer but also
received 11 percent higher prices for their grains (Shukla et al., 2019a). If we
quantify the economic benefits of improved market prices for grains at sale,
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decreased grain losses due to pest damage, and the reduced need to buy from
the market when prices are higher, an average farmer would recover the full
unsubsidized cost of the technology in one agricultural season.
This study is characterized by a few design limitations that may limit the
scope of our findings. First, it is possible to argue that having access to
improved storage led to some economic benefits, and the consequent income
effect is driving the increased WTP during the second purchase decision.
While that is a possibility, it does not necessarily bias our results. The in-
crease in household income is an intended effect of the technology, and any
resultant increase in WTP would still add to the aggregate demand for tech-
nology. However, if the income effect is indeed driving a part of the result,
we may be overestimating the effect from experiential learning. Second, it is
possible that the lack of evidence for reference dependence is a result of our
peculiar experimental design. Because the auction participants knew that
the actual price paid is an outcome of a random draw, it may have prevented
the formation of a price reference point, in which case, we would find no
evidence of anchoring.
Our findings strongly suggest that experience drives adoption. Another
key finding of our study is that the user groups with low initial WTP may
be the ones who benefit the most from adopting a technology. The results
of this study inform policies for pricing and promoting technology adoption
not just in the field of agriculture, but in other fields as well where a new,
beneficial technology may be an experience good.
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3.6 Figures and Tables
Figure 3.1: Distribution of prices drawn in the auction
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Figure 3.2: Aggregate demand curve for improved storage technology
(Round 1 and 2)
Figure 3.3: Impact of hermetic storage on food security outcomes
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Figure 3.4: Heterogeneity in Treatment Effects across WTP Distribution
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Table 3.1: Baseline descriptive statistics for round 1 sample
(1) (2) (3)
Mean OLS Coeff. on OLS Coeff. on
(SD) Qualify Price drawn
Age of household head 45.89 0.972 -0.0328
(14.189) (0.799) (0.0257)
No school 0.44 -0.0827*** 0.00176**
(0.497) (0.0275) (0.000884)
Primary 0.15 -0.00839 0.000986
(0.362) (0.0206) (0.000662)
Secondary 0.27 0.0421* -0.00135*
(0.445) (0.0255) (0.000819)
Household size 4.10 -0.0936 0.00566
(2.209) (0.121) (0.00387)
Household has at least one migrant member 0.30 -0.0357* 0.00106
(0.460) (0.0215) (0.000690)
Farm size category:
Landless 0.28 -0.0210 0.0000210
(0.451) (0.0225) (0.000721)
Marginal (<1 ha) 0.65 0.0106 0.000471
(0.477) (0.0235) (0.000753)
Small (1 - 2 ha) 0.04 0.0114 -0.000411
(0.187) (0.0107) (0.000344)
Large (>2 ha) 0.03 -0.00104 -0.0000812
(0.171) (0.00935) (0.000300)
Operational holdings (number) 1.90 0.0584 -0.00225
(2.068) (0.0997) (0.00320)
Taken any credit? (Yes = 1) 0.41 -0.00930 0.000157
(0.491) (0.0223) (0.000716)
Per capita daily food expenditure (INR) 10.80 0.872* -0.0161
(10.530) (0.490) (0.0157)
Dietary diversity score (0-15 scale) 10.27 0.0977 -0.00395
(2.232) (0.0968) (0.00311)
Share of grains from own sources (%) 37.48 0.566 -0.0626
(32.814) (1.581) (0.0507)
Share of grains from PDS (%) 23.21 -1.705 0.0312
(21.118) (1.087) (0.0349)
Share of grain from market (%) 38.50 0.707 0.0406
(31.140) (1.561) (0.0501)
Sold any grain in market? (Yes = 1) 0.17 0.00443 -0.000519
(0.379) (0.0184) (0.000589)
Observations 1429
F-test of joint significance 1.43 1.16
p-value 0.1139 0.2896
Notes: Column (1) presents the sample mean and standard deviation of the baseline
variables. Column (2) shows the coefficient and standard errors from an OLS regression
(separate regression for each row) of the baseline covariate on the indicator for whether
the individual qualified for hermetic bag purchase in the Round 1 auction along with WTP
and village-level fixed effects. Column (3) presents the coefficients and standard errors on
the price drawn (price at which the qualified individuals purchase the bag) from a similar
regression. The bottom two rows in Columns (2) and (3) present the results of the F-test
for joint significance of all the baseline covariates on the qualification indicator and price
drawn variable respectively. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent
critical level.
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Table 3.2: Testing for differential attrition and selection in the round 2
sample
(1) (2) (3)
Hermetic bags -0.0490 0.0179 0.0171
(0.0347) (0.0329) (0.0284)
Round 1 WTP dummies No Yes Yes
Baseline covariates No No Yes
Observations 1429 1429 1429
Notes: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors clustered at village level.
Column (1) is OLS with no controls. Column (2) includes round 1 WTP dummies. Column
(3) adds baseline control variables to specification in (2). Dependent variable takes the
value 1 if the household is in the second round sample.
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Table 3.3: Baseline descriptive statistics for round 2 sample
(1) (2) (3)
Mean OLS Coeff. on OLS Coeff. on
(SD) Qualify Price drawn
Age of household head 45.77 1.910 -0.0467
(14.186) (1.232) (0.0389)
No school 0.53 -0.0475 0.00111
(0.500) (0.0437) (0.00138)
Primary 0.15 -0.0223 0.00120
(0.356) (0.0316) (0.000999)
Secondary 0.23 0.0429 -0.00142
(0.421) (0.0375) (0.00119)
Household size 3.87 0.0399 0.00110
(2.075) (0.173) (0.00546)
Household has at least one migrant member 0.19 -0.0100 0.000826
(0.394) (0.0296) (0.000934)
Farm size category:
Landless 0.42 -0.0611* 0.00135
(0.493) (0.0357) (0.00113)
Marginal (<1 ha) 0.50 0.0609* -0.00127
(0.500) (0.0353) (0.00112)
Small (1 - 2 ha) 0.03 0.00651 -0.000106
(0.183) (0.0164) (0.000518)
Large (>2 ha) 0.05 -0.00626 0.0000340
(0.209) (0.0168) (0.000531)
Operational holdings (number) 1.80 0.159 -0.00529
(2.002) (0.145) (0.00457)
Taken any credit? (Yes = 1) 0.33 0.0633** -0.00183*
(0.471) (0.0321) (0.00101)
Per capita daily food expenditure (INR) 13.25 0.571 0.00197
(13.905) (0.978) (0.0309)
Dietary diversity score (0-15 scale) 9.63 0.127 -0.000578
(2.196) (0.172) (0.00544)
Share of grains from own sources (%) 36.54 3.315 -0.119
(36.623) (2.715) (0.0857)
Share of grains from PDS (%) 18.47 -1.308 0.0202
(20.790) (1.708) (0.0540)
Share of grain from market (%) 43.55 -2.631 0.111
(34.220) (2.646) (0.0835)
Sold any grain in market? (Yes = 1) 0.12 0.00285 -0.000671
(0.322) (0.0264) (0.000834)
Observations 633
F-test of joint significance 0.85 0.85
p-value 0.6356 0.6984
Notes: : Column (1) presents the sample mean and standard deviation of the baseline
variables. Column (2) shows the coefficient and standard errors from an OLS regression
(separate regression for each row) of the baseline covariate on the indicator for whether
the individual qualified for hermetic bag purchase in the Round 1 auction along with WTP
and village-level fixed effects. Column (3) presents the coefficients and standard errors on
the price drawn (price at which the qualified individuals purchase the bag) from a similar
regression. The bottom two rows in Columns (2) and (3) present the results of the F-test
for joint significance of all the baseline covariates on the qualification indicator and price
drawn variable respectively. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent
critical level.
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Table 3.4: Willingness to pay in Round 1 auction
Mean s.d. Observations
Qualified to purchase: No
WTP (in INR) 21.94 7.12 814
Qualified to purchase: Yes
WTP (in INR) 28.6 12.85 615
Total
WTP (in INR) 25.75 11.26 1429
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Table 3.5: Determinants of WTP in Round 1
WTP Round 1
Age of household head 0.0112
(0.0212)




Number of livelihood sources 0.523**
(0.211)
Household has at least one migrant member -1.790**
(0.781)
Taken any credit? -0.872
(0.757)




Marginal (<1 ha) 0.902
(0.774)
Small (1 - 2 ha) 2.482
(1.663)
Large (> 2 ha) 2.090
(1.861)
Observations 1429
Notes: : Standard errors in parentheses. Each cell presents the coefficient on the baseline
variable from a separate regression with WTP as the dependent variables. All regressions
include village-level fixed effects. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10
percent critical level.
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Table 3.6: Impact of using heremtic bags on WTP in Round 2
(1) (2) (3)
Qualified in round 1 5.900∗∗∗ 5.723∗∗∗ 5.797∗∗∗
(0.839) (0.831) (0.848)
Round 1 WTP dummies Yes Yes Yes
Village FE No Yes Yes
Baseline covariates No No Yes
Mean WTP control group 22.10 22.10 22.10
Observations 633 633 633
Notes: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors clustered at village level.
Column (1) is OLS with only round 1 WTP dummies. Column (2) includes village level
FE. Column (3) adds baseline control variables to specification in (2). Dependent variable
is willingness to pay in round 2.
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Table 3.7: Determinants of change in WTP from Round 1 to Round 2
∆ WTP (Round 2 - Round 1)
Stored rice (Yes = 1) 2.454**
(1.234)
Stored any grain (Yes=1) 3.001**
(1.402)
Max. rice storage duration (days) 0.00920**
(0.004)
Max. storage duration any grain (in days) 0.00783*
(0.004)
Share of rice output stored after harvest (%) 0.00474
(0.013)
Quantity of rice stored after harvest (kg) 0.000568
(0.001)
Main source of rice consumption is own stocks 1.041
(1.242)
Main source of wheat consumption is own stocks 0.844
(1.236)
Mean ∆ WTP 3.23
N 300
Notes: : Robust standard errors in parentheses. Each cell shows the coefficient and
SE from a bivariate regression with outcome as change in WTP and benefit measure as
independent variable. All specifications control for baseline covariates, Round WTP fixed
effects and village fixed effects. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.8: Heterogeneity in the impact of hermetic bags across WTP bins
Low WTP Medium WTP High WTP
Stored any grain (Yes=1) 0.119∗∗∗ 0.139∗∗∗ 0.00838
(0.0378) (0.0477) (0.0488)
Max. storage duration 18.83∗ 39.37∗∗ 2.809
any grain (in days) (10.94) (15.33) (15.94)
Share of rice output stored 4.879∗ 10.08∗∗ -8.783
after harvest (%) (2.529) (4.465) (6.055)
Quantity of rice stored 46.44 113.8 -7.503
after harvest (kg) (50.60) (69.90) (119.9)
Share of maize output stored 3.608 2.301 2.532
after harvest (%) (2.585) (2.248) (3.066)
Quantity of maize stored 21.63∗∗ 6.692 22.89
after harvest (kg) (9.666) (13.99) (16.69)
Quantity of grain stored 65.65 109.2 66.88
after harvest (kg) (53.53) (75.64) (123.8)
Main source of rice consumption 0.0287 0.113∗∗∗ -0.0582
is own stocks (0.0330) (0.0416) (0.0617)
Rice share of consumption -1.377 -5.788 4.524
from market sources (%) (3.323) (4.182) (8.738)
Main source of wheat consumption 0.0473 0.0727 0.00281
is own stocks (0.0355) (0.0444) (0.0733)
Wheat share of consumption -2.517 -6.180∗∗ -0.00838
from market sources (%) (2.923) (3.141) (7.112)
Observations 629 548 252
Notes: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors clustered at the village level.
Each cell shows coefficient and SE on the treatment variable from a separate regression.
The specification includes village level FE along with WTP dummies and baseline controls.
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Table 3.9: Testing for anchoring effects of price paid (drawn) in Round 1 on
WTP in Round 2
(1) (2) (3)
Qualified in round 1 5.989∗∗∗ 5.815∗∗∗ 5.674∗∗∗
(0.921) (0.919) (0.923)
Qualified in round 1
and price drawn was:
Low (= 10) ref. ref. ref.
Medium (> 10,≤ 20) 0.0463 0.0374 0.246
(1.152) (1.096) (1.093)
High (> 20) 0.205 -0.0194 -0.908
(2.490) (2.702) (2.513)
Round 1 WTP dummies Yes Yes Yes
Village FE No Yes Yes
Baseline covariates No No Yes
Mean WTP for control group 22.10 22.10 22.10
Observations 633 633 633
p-value of F-test for equality 0.948 0.983 0.638
of interaction terms
Notes: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors clustered at the village level.
Column (1) is OLS with only round 1 WTP dummies. Column (2) includes village level
FE. Column (3) adds baseline control variables to specification in (2). Mean WTP control
group is the mean of the WTP in Round 2 for those who did not qualify in Round 1. The
p-value shown is from the test of equality for the two interaction terms (medium and high
price draws).
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Table 3.10: Testing for spatial spillover effects on WTP in the second round
(1) (2) (3)
Qualified in round 1 5.749*** 5.759*** 5.731***
(0.946) (0.933) (0.957)
[0.957] [0.9732] [0.956]
Density of neighbors purchasing bags in Round 1 -0.965
(2.745)
[3.034]
Mean WTP of neighbors (Round 1) -0.0464
(0.114)
[0.176]
Mean price paid by neighbors (Round 1) 0.047
(0.073)
[0.075]
Round 1 WTP dummies Yes Yes Yes
Village FE Yes Yes Yes
Baseline covariates Yes Yes Yes
Mean WTP for control group 22.23 22.23 22.23
Observations 596 596 596
Notes: : Standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses. Conley (1999) SE
in square brackets. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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CHAPTER 4
SAFE AND SECURE: IMPACT OF
IMPROVED STORAGE TECHNOLOGY
ON FOOD SECURITY IN INDIA
4.1 Introduction
Arguably, an estimated one third of all food produced is lost or wasted after
harvest (Gustavsson et al., 2011; Zorya et al., 2011). In terms of calories,
global food losses amount to nearly 24 percent of all food produced (Lipinski
et al., 2013). The Food and Agriculture Organization of the U.N. estimates
that about 1.3 billion tons of food per year are lost after the harvest and be-
fore reaching consumers plates. Put in perspective, a 50 percent decrease in
losses would be equivalent to adding more than 550 million acres of agricul-
tural land, which is greater than the total amount of arable land in the United
States and Canada added together. Thus, reducing postharvest losses ap-
pears to be a promising way to ensure food security and increase the amount
of food available for human consumption. However, much of the focus on
postharvest losses has targeted reducing the quantity of physical grain lost,
instead of taking a broader approach that includes the economic aspects of
food losses. In a meta-analysis, Affognon et al. (2015) summarize that more
often, losses are economic rather than loss of physical product. Postharvest
losses not only reduce the quantity of food available for consumption, but
poor postharvest management also compromises the quality of food grains
for sale, fetching lower market prices and adversely impacting farmers house-
hold incomes. Lack of appropriate grain storage technology can also lead to
food contamination, pest and rodent damage resulting in health hazards and
reducing the farmers ability to store grains for lean season. The aggregate
effects of these factors can have an overall negative impact on all four dimen-
sions of food security - availability, access, utilization and stability (Council,
2004). Researchers point out methodological inconsistencies in measuring
food losses (Bellemare et al., 2017; Affognon et al., 2015) but there seems to
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be consensus that high food losses negatively impact food security.
Previous research has found that storage technology can have wide ranging
impacts on some indicators of food security. Using nationally representative
data from Ethiopia, Tesfaye and Tirivayi (2018) find that using improved
storage technology has a positive impact on dietary diversity, self-reported
food insecurity and child malnutrition. Another study in the maize growing
regions of Kenya uses propensity score matching to find that using hermeti-
cally sealed metal silos saved between USD 102 to 130 worth of physical grain
losses for farmers. Farmers who used metal silos also spent less on storage
pesticides and stored their grains for around two more months as compared
to the non-users (Gitonga et al., 2013). In developing countries, traditional
storage practices result in high postharvest losses that lead to farmers selling
their crops soon after harvest when the prices are low only to buy it back
from the open market when prices are higher (Tefera et al., 2011). While
one of the reasons for farmers not utilizing the arbitrage opportunity may
be credit constraints (Baylis et al., 2015; Burke et al., 2018), we find in this
paper that lack of access to proper storage technology is also a part of the
problem.
Another major source of food insecurity that can be addressed by improved
storage technology is the lack of access to safe, toxin-free food. Aflatoxin con-
tamination of food grains is one of the major threats to food safety (Williams
et al., 2004; Bryden, 2007b; Shephard, 2008; Reddy et al., 2010). Aflatox-
ins are secondary metabolites of molds that pose a serious hazard to animal
and human health. A warm and humid climate is optimal for the growth
of these molds which primarily impact human health through the direct in-
gestion of contaminated grains or dairy products from animals exposed to
contamination (Peraica et al., 1999). Aflatoxicosis in humans can manifest
itself through a wide range of health risks including compromised immunity,
reduced micronutrient absorption, liver, kidney and spleen enlargement, in-
fertility, low birth weight, stunting, birth defects and multiple carcinogenic
effects (Kumar et al., 2017). An estimated 4.5 billion people in developing
countries are chronically exposed to aflatoxins with the most vulnerable be-
ing pregnant women and children (Williams et al., 2004; Ostry et al., 2017).
Large doses of aflatoxin lead to acute illness and high mortality rates; chronic
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low doses have adverse immunological and nutritional outcomes; both of these
have an aggregate effect on the risk of cancer. Preventing contamination is
the most advocated practice to minimize exposure because once contami-
nated, there are few cost effective way to decontaminate grains. Since most
of the aflatoxin contamination in grains in developing countries occurs during
storage, both chronic and acute aflatoxin exposures can be minimized by bet-
ter postharvest storage (Turner et al., 2005; Mutungi et al., 2016; Williams
et al., 2014).
In this paper, we use a broad definition of postharvest losses which takes
into account economic, along with physical losses to capture the full extent of
the impact of postharvest storage technology on food security. We posit that
providing safe storage technology to smallholder farmers has the potential to
address all four dimensions of food security. To test this hypothesis, we con-
duct a randomized control trial with 1429 farmers in 42 villages of 5 districts
in the eastern state of Bihar in India. We use the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak
(BDM) auction method (Becker et al., 1964) for treatment assignment at
the household level. We offer GrainPro hermetically sealed storage bags at
subsidized rates and measure smallholder farmers willingness to pay for this
storage technology1. In this paper, we focus on measuring the impact of using
safe storage technology on all four dimensions of food security, conditional
on farmers willingness to pay. We compare the treatment group of farmers
who purchased hermetic bags on subsidized prices through a randomized lot-
tery to those who did not to examine the impact of storage bags on physical
quantity and quality of grain losses, market prices, aflatoxin contamination,
storage quantity, and duration of storage. To measure the direct income
effect of improved storage technology, we also conduct a storage and sales
experiment with a sub-sample of farmers where we encourage them to store
maize in two hermetic and two traditional bags over a period of four months.
The farmers then sell one bag of each kind separately to the same trader to
understand the price premia on grain quality attributable to improved stor-
age. Our results show that having access to improved storage leads farmers
to store a larger share of their output for a longer duration, decreases physical
losses due to rodent and fungal damage, reduces aflatoxin levels, substitutes
1More details about the auction and our findings on the measures and determinants of
willingness to pay are available in Shukla et al. (2019a)
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consumption away from market sources to own stocks, and gets better mar-
ket prices for stored grains after a few months. The economic cost-benefit
analysis of improved storage technology shows that farmers recover the full,
unsubsidized cost of hermetic storage bags in one agricultural season.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to look at the im-
pact of storage technology on all four dimensions of food security by taking
a broader definition of postharvest losses to include physical grain losses,
economic losses, and health costs. In addition to estimating the impact of
improved storage technology on factors related to households own consump-
tion, we also use a field experiment to estimate the direct income effect of
having access to improved storage technology on smallholder farmers in de-
veloping countries like India. With a more inclusive estimate of benefits, we
are able to conduct a more comprehensive cost-benefit analysis of improved
storage technology and make policy recommendations. The rest of the paper
discusses the conceptual framework and experimental design in more detail,
followed by discussion of estimation strategy, results, cost benefit analysis
and conclusion.
4.2 Conceptual Framework
As defined by FAO (Council, 2004), the four pillars of food security include
availability, access, utilization and stability. Availability refers to the supply
of food - not just in terms of quantity but also quality. Access is about the
affordability of food, which can be promoted by lowering available food prices
and/or improving household income. Utilization refers to the use of safe food
in a way that supports a healthy life. Finally, stability requires continued
access to safe and healthy food at all times and the ability to smooth con-
sumption over different income shocks. We test the hypothesis that access to
improved storage can impact all four dimensions of food security by reduc-
ing postharvest grain quality and quantity losses during storage, improving
household incomes and food safety, and providing a means for consumption
smoothing during lean season. Figure 4.1 shows the channels through which
we hypothesize these impacts could occur. The decrease in storage losses in
terms of quantity lost to spoilage, pests and rodents increases the amount
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of grain available for sale and household consumption. Storage in hermetic
bag retains grain quality for longer and provides benefits that are twofold.
Not only does it provide arbitrage opportunity to farmers to sell at a later
date when prices are higher, it also provides them the option to store grain
for their own consumption eliminating the need to buy back from the open
market later at higher prices. This is both directly profitable and cost-saving
for smallholders and provides a means to store grains for lean season.
We posit that another benefit of using improved storage would be on food
safety attributes. As past research findings suggest (Williams et al., 2014;
Mutungi et al., 2016), hermetic storage limits the growth and spread of afla-
toxin contamination. Gitonga et al. (2013) find that farmers who had access
to better storage technology also used less pesticides during storage. Both
these factors contribute to improved measures of food safety and nutrition by
reducing exposure to toxic fumigants and decreasing the incidence of aflatox-
icosis from chronic exposure to contaminants that compromise animal and
human health.
The aggregate effect of increased quantity available for consumption and
sale, higher market prices, improved nutrition and longer storage duration
has an overall impact on improving food security. In the following section, we
discuss our experimental design, estimation strategy and present our results.
4.3 Study Area and Experimental Design
According to 2012 estimates, the eastern state of Bihar is one of the poorest
and the third most populous state in India with over 33 percent of the pop-
ulation living below the government estimated poverty line (Reserve Bank
of India, 2013). The average annual per capita income of sampled farmers
is about USD 230 and 83 percent of the farmers have less than one hectare
of land. Around 90 percent of the cropped area is under food grains with
majority being under rice, wheat and maize. Our research area covers 80 vil-
lages of five districts in Bihar. From these 80 villages, we randomly selected
50 farmers from each village to get a total sample of 4000 farmers. We then
randomly selected 42 villages to participate in auctions for hermetic bags.
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The details of each treatment arm and sample size is shown in Figure 4.2.
We used GrainPro SuperGrain bags of 50 kilogram (110 lbs.) capacity each
and restricted the number of bags available for purchase to a maximum of
five bags per farmer. Results on the measures and determinants of farmers,
traders and end-users willingness to pay are detailed in Shukla et al. (2019c).
Our experiment employs a BDM auction as the method of treatment
assignment and to measure farmers willingness to pay for the technology.
Briefly, the BDM mechanism operates as follows: After providing informa-
tion about the benefits of the improved storage technology, we ask the farmer
to state how much they are willing to pay for a hermetic bag (their bid). Then
a random price is drawn from a range of prices. If the price drawn is lower
or equal to the individuals bid, they buy the bag at the price that is drawn.
If the price drawn is higher than the individuals bid, they do not qualify to
buy the bag. For each WTP level, the experimental design randomly qualifies
farmers to receive the technology, thus allowing us to compare farmers who
have the same WTP but through a random draw, were assigned to either
treatment or control group. We use a private single-buyer, single-seller for-
mat to individually auction the bags to each farmer. Before the auction, the
field enumerator explains to the farmer how the BDM auction works both
verbally and by simulation2. Figure 4.3 shows the distribution of prices paid
for the bags in auction. Distribution of prices in the lottery is skewed to the
left to increase the probability of farmers winning the auction and qualifying
to purchase the bags.
Table 4.1 shows the comparison of baseline characteristics and balance
across treatment and control groups. In Figure 4.4, we show the timeline of
interventions and data collection to provide a clearer picture of our experi-
mental design.
2We used two small packs of cookies for the simulation and only proceeded to the actual
bag auction once the farmer understood the mechanism because the actual auction can
only be conducted once with each farmer.
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4.4 Estimation Strategy
For estimating the impact of storage bags on food security, we focus on like-
lihood and duration of storage, share and quantity of grain stored, source of
grain consumption, likelihood of selling grains in the market, dietary diver-
sity score, aflatoxin levels, and grain losses during storage due to pests and
rodents.
To understand the impact of improved storage on food security, we esti-
mate the following equation:
Yi,v,d = β0 + β1Ti + µWTP + δXi + λv + εi (4.1)
where Yi,v,d is the outcome for farmer i in village v and district d. Ti is
an indicator taking the value 1 if the farmer qualified in the auction process
and purchased hermetic bags. µWTP is WTP fixed effects. Xi is a vector
of baseline covariates that are uncorrelated with the treatment. λv are vil-
lage fixed effects (FE). Under this specification, we compare the outcomes
for farmers who qualified for hermetic bags with farmers within the same
village who did not qualify. While this is our preferred specification, we also
show results from regressions without any control variables, and with district
FE and baseline variables instead of village FE. Overall, our results remain
robust to these alternate specifications.
4.5 Results
Our first set of results in Table 4.2 show the impact of using hermetic bags on
availability of food by reducing postharvest grain losses due to rodent and
pest damage. In panel A, we compare losses for grains stored in hermetic
bags by treatment farmers to grains stored in traditional bags by control
group farmers. Nearly all farmers reported no losses due to rodent and/or
pests for grains stored in hermetic bags. As a falsification test, Panel B re-
ports the incidence of grain damage in traditional storage bags among the
treatment and control group farmers. As one would expect, when the grains
are stored in traditional bags, grain losses for both the groups are not statis-
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tically different.
To understand the impact of improved storage on inter-temporal consump-
tion smoothing, and thus the dimension of stability, we look at results in
Table 4.3 , 4.4 4 and 4.5. In Tables 4.3 and 4.4, we present results for the
impact of access to improved storage on the likelihood of storage, storage
duration, and share of output and quantity stored. Table 4.3 shows that
farmers who had access to improved storage were 27, 29 and 30 percent more
likely to store rice, maize, and any grain respectively than the farmers in
the control group. The duration of storage for the treatment group was also
significantly higher by approximately 24, 28 and 25 percent for rice, maize,
and any grain respectively. In Table 4.4, we see a significant increase in the
share and quantity of output stored after harvest. Treatment group rice and
maize farmers stored 19 and 25 percent higher shares of their grain compared
to control group farmers. The quantity of rice, maize and any grain stored
increases by a significant 24, 73 and 24 percent respectively.
In Table 4.5, we see that even though the quantity of rice and wheat
consumed does not change, the source of rice consumption from own stocks
increases by 25 percent for the treated group compared to the control group.
Similarly, for wheat, consumption from own stocks increases by 16 percent,
and consumption from market sources decreases by 8 percent. While we find
some evidence of a shift away from market sources of grains to consumption
from own stocks, we do not find an increase in the overall amount of rice
or wheat consumed. This is similar to the results in Basu and Wong (2015)
which finds that a seasonal food storage program and a food credit program
had no impact on household staple food consumption, evidence that the av-
erage household may be close to staple food satiation.
Table 4.6 shows the impact of access to improved storage on non-staple
food consumption. We find no significant impact on any of the non-staple
foods except an increase of 5 and 7 percent on sugar and dairy respectively.
As a result, we also find little impact on the dietary diversity score and food
consumption value from all sources, as shown in table 7.
Similar to the findings in Aggarwal et al. (2018), we show in Table 4.8 that
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the treatment group experienced a 30 percent increase in the likelihood of
selling grains in the market compared to the control group.
To look at the utilization dimension of food security, we test the impact
of improved storage on food safety, particularly aflatoxin contamination of
grains. In Table 4.9, we present our results from testing a balanced sub-
sample of 197 maize, wheat, and rice samples3. We collected grain samples
from hermetic and traditional bags from the treatment group farmers to esti-
mate the impact of using improved storage on aflatoxin levels. We find that
using hermetic bags decreases the likelihood of aflatoxin contamination by 63
percent and the incidence of aflatoxin by around 75 percent. These results
are similar to the findings in other studies which show the effectiveness of
improved storage for reducing the incidence of aflatoxin in grains (Williams
et al., 2014; Mutungi et al., 2016).
To understand the direct income effect and carry out a comprehensive cost-
benefit analysis of improved storage technology, we also need to understand
the market price premia, if any, for better grain quality attributable to safe
storage. A number of factors determine grain prices in fragmented, infor-
mal rural markets, where traders might have more market power and ability
to extract rents (Mallory and Baylis, 2012; Pullabhotla and Baylis, 2019).
Thus, it is not immediately obvious that the grain quality improvements
from better storage would translate into price premia for farmers. Instead
of making any assumptions about price premia for better quality grains,
we test this hypothesis to see if investment in storage technology finds an
economic justification. We take a representative sub-sample of 200 maize
farmers for a storage and sales experiment conducted over a period of four
months. Each farmer received two hermetic bags (free of cost). The farmers
were encouraged to store their maize harvest in these bags as well as in two
other traditional bags. They were then asked to sell one bag of each kind
during a specified week approximately two months after harvest. The grain
moisture was measured at storage and at the time of the sales. All sales
3We used the ELISA test to determine the level of aflatoxin in our samples. The US
government enforces 20 ppb as the permissible limit of aflatoxin in food grains while the
European Union uses a 10 ppb limit. The government of India prescribes an aflatoxin
limit of 30 ppb for food grains but we did not find any evidence of enforcement of this
limit in any literature, news reports, etc.
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took place within a one week period. Each farmer sold both the hermetically
stored maize as well as the maize from the traditional bag, separately, to the
same trader on the same day. The maize in the hermetic bag was taken out
from the bag (since farmers did not want to sell the hermetic bag along with
the maize), transferred to a usual traditional bag and then sold to the trader.
Each bag was marked to ensure that the grain was not mixed together for
sale. Field staff accompanied each farmer to the trader and recorded the
price for each batch of maize right after the sale. Enumerators were trained
and instructed to act as non-participant observers to make sure that they do
not influence the bargaining and price discovery process.
To measure the impact of improved storage on market price premia, we
estimate the following equation:
Yi,b = β0 + β1Di,b + δXi,b + λi (4.2)
where Yi,b is the outcome variable for farmer i for the maize stored in bag
type b. Di,b is a binary variable taking the value 1 if the observation corre-
sponds to hermetic bag storage and value 0 if it is traditional bag storage.
Xi,b is a vector of farmer and storage specific controls. When the dependent
variable is change in grain moisture during storage, the control variables in-
clude date of sale dummies (to control for any variation in prices due to
timing of sale) and duration of storage before the maize was sold. Addition-
ally, we also include controls for the grain moisture level at the time of sale
in the regressions with price received as dependent variable.
We first show estimates for the above regression without any control vari-
ables, and with fixed effects at district or village level along with the control
variables in columns (1), (2) and (3) of Table 4.10. Column (4) presents our
preferred specification using farmer level fixed effects (we only control for
grain moisture level in the sale price regressions under this specification).
The results in Table 4.10 show the impact of using hermetic bags on pro-
moting economic and affordable access to food. As explained in this paper
earlier, improved storage technology may affect economic access by provid-
ing a temporal arbitrage opportunity to farmers. We conducted the storage
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and sales experiment to understand if a temporal arbitrage opportunity ex-
ists and whether better quality grains from hermetic storage receive better
market prices. We find that average prices obtained for maize in hermetic
and traditional bags were INR 1202 and INR 1085 per quintal4 respectively.
Table 4.10 shows that on average, maize from hermetic bags received almost
11 percent higher prices than that stored in traditional bags. These regres-
sion results confirm that hermetic bags not only preserve grain quality, these
quality attributes also translate into better market prices for the farmers in
their local markets.
4.6 Cost Benefit Analysis of Improved Storage
Technology
A simple cost-benefit analysis demonstrates a high return to the use of on-
farm hermetic storage technology as opposed to the typical storage methods
farmers currently use. We assume two potential scenarios one, where all
the grain produced is sold in the market and the other where all the grain
produced is used for own consumption. Using previous studies on the health
impacts of consuming aflatoxin contaminated grain, we also comment on the
unobservable health benefits of improved storage technology.
4.6.1 Observable (financial) Benefits
Table 4.11 presents the cost-benefit analysis of on-farm hermetic storage
under two scenarios, including estimates with and without the premium from
selling aflatoxin-free grains in high value markets. We use the following data
and assumptions for our cost-benefit calculations.
1. Quantity calculation (row a) - Our experiment on physical loss mea-
surement shows that an average of 10 percent of grain is lost to pest,
fungal and rodent damage in traditional storage. We also find that
nearly 100 percent of this damage is eliminated by using hermitic stor-
age. Thus, the quantity available for consumption or sale in 45 kg from
traditional bags and 50 kg from improved storage.
41 quintal = 100 kgs
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2. Value calculation (row b) - Maize stored for an average of two months
after harvest in traditional storage fetched INR 1085 per quintal (or
INR 10.85 per kg) while that stored in improved storage fetched INR
1202 per quintal (or INR 12.02 per kg) an increase of 10.8 percent in
price. We also know that the average price of medium quality grain
purchased from local trader/retailer is INR 22 per kg.
3. Cost of bag calculation (row d) - The cost of a jute bag is INR 10
and the cost of the hermetic storage bags used for this experiment is
INR 80 per bag. Our follow up survey found that the improved storage
bags were being reused by nearly all farmers for a four seasons. To
take this into account, we spread the cost of storage technology over
four agricultural seasons (or two years). However, to ensure longevity
and effectiveness, improved (hermetic) storage bags are best used as
an additional inner layer with traditional bags. Therefore, we add the
cost of traditional bags to hermetic bags to calculate the full cost of
using improved storage (i.e. the cost of improved storage per season:
(80/4) + 10 = INR 30.
4. Value calculation with potential aflatoxin-free premium (row g) - Traders
surveyed in high value markets (Hyderabad and Delhi) buy maize with
low aflatoxin content at an average of INR 1300 per quintal (or INR
13 per kg). These traders reported not buying grain from Bihar due to
high aflatoxin levels, particularly in maize. Improved storage reduces
aflatoxin contamination by nearly 75 percent bringing it down to per-
missible levels and providing an opportunity to farmers to access high
value markets. We assume that nearly 50 percent of the difference in
price is attributable to factors like transaction costs and non-aflatoxin
related unobservable grain quality, there is still a price premium for low
aflatoxin grains for farmers (INR ((13 12.02) * 0.5) = INR 0.49). Thus
the price per kg with potential aflatoxin premium will be INR (12.02
+ 0.49) = INR 12.51
Whether all of the grain produced is used for own consumption or sold
in the market, we find that using improved storage is profitable under both
scenarios with and without aflatoxin-free premium. The benefit of using im-
proved storage is highest when farmers are able to access high value markets
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due to the reduction in aflatoxin levels. Figure 5 plots the financial benefits,
along with the cost of improved storage, under both scenarios to show the
profitability of on-farm hermetic storage.
4.6.2 Unobservable (health) Benefits
Liu et al. (2012) estimate that nearly 21-24% of hepatocellular carcinoma
(HCC) cases globally can be attributed to aflatoxin contamination. Even
though the health impacts of consuming aflatoxin contaminated grains are
not limited to HCC, but also include other serious health conditions like fe-
tal malformation, neural birth defects among others, studies using only HCC
data find that aflatoxin reduction strategies can be very cost-effective. Wu
and Khlangwiset (2010) estimate the economic health impact and cost effec-
tiveness of aflatoxin reduction strategies in Nigeria and Guinea using data
on aflatoxin-induced HCC cases. They find that economic health benefits
from aflatoxin reduction interventions in terms of lives saved and quality of
life gained by reducing aflatoxin-induced HCC far exceed the cost of inter-
vention. The study estimates that the cost-effectiveness ratio (CER) of such
interventions is greater than one, which is considered very cost-effective by
the World Health Organization.
4.7 Conclusion
We begin this paper by talking about the impact of storage technology on all
four dimensions of food security availability, access, utilization and stability.
To show that storage technology can impact availability of food, we look
at how improved storage increases the supply of food in terms of both qual-
ity and quantity. Farmers using hermetic storage experience minimal grain
losses due to pest and rodent damage during storage and have higher quality
of grains for both home consumption and sale in the market.
The impact of storage technology on improving access to food through
increased household income is twofold. First, grains stored in hermetic bags
retain higher quality attributes and fetch better prices in the market when
sold over a period of four months, thereby providing an arbitrage opportu-
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nity. Second, farmers who have access to improved storage substitute their
consumption away from market sources to their own stocks, eliminating the
need to buy back from the market at potentially higher prices. Both of these
have a positive impact on the household income of smallholder farmers.
In terms of utilization of food, we find that aflatoxin contamination is
significantly lower for farmers who store their grains in hermetic bags as op-
posed to traditional bags. Finally, our results suggest that access to improved
storage has the most direct impact on food stability, i.e. the continued ac-
cess of safe food over time and income shocks. We find that farmers who had
access to hermetic bags were more likely to store grains, and stored larger
quantities for longer duration into the lean season.
While we provided farmers with subsidized bags for our experiment, a
simple economic cost-benefit analysis shows that an average farmer recovers
the full unsubsidized cost of a hermetic bag in one agricultural season. Our
cost benefit analysis does not include the non-market health benefits of using
hermetic storage which similar studies in Nigeria and Guinea indicate would
also be significantly large.
We also estimate in the same study area that on average, farmers willing-
ness to pay for improved storage is nearly three times that of their current
method of storage (Shukla et al., 2019a). However, the farmers average will-
ingness to pay still covers only around 30 percent of the unsubsidized market
price of the hermetic storage bags. We also find that farmers demand for
improved storage increases by almost 25 percent after they have used the im-
proved storage technology for one year and understand the benefits (Shukla
et al., 2019b).
Access to a simple and locally replicable storage technology, particularly in
developing countries where storage infrastructure - both public and private
- is scarce, these findings suggest a potential solution for policy makers who
aim to improve food security using cost-effective interventions.
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4.8 Figures and Tables
Figure 4.1: Theory of Change
Figure 4.2: Experimental Design
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Figure 4.3: Distribution of prices drawn in auction
Figure 4.4: Timeline of Interventions/Surveys
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Figure 4.5: Benefit from using Improved Storage
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Table 4.1: Baseline descriptive statistics for round 1 sample
(1) (2) (3)
Mean OLS Coeff. on OLS Coeff. on
(SD) Qualify Price drawn
Age of household head 45.89 0.972 -0.0328
(14.189) (0.799) (0.0257)
No school 0.44 -0.0827*** 0.00176**
(0.497) (0.0275) (0.000884)
Primary 0.15 -0.00839 0.000986
(0.362) (0.0206) (0.000662)
Secondary 0.27 0.0421* -0.00135*
(0.445) (0.0255) (0.000819)
Household size 4.10 -0.0936 0.00566
(2.209) (0.121) (0.00387)
Household has at least one migrant member 0.30 -0.0357* 0.00106
(0.460) (0.0215) (0.000690)
Farm size category:
Landless 0.28 -0.0210 0.0000210
(0.451) (0.0225) (0.000721)
Marginal (<1 ha) 0.65 0.0106 0.000471
(0.477) (0.0235) (0.000753)
Small (1 - 2 ha) 0.04 0.0114 -0.000411
(0.187) (0.0107) (0.000344)
Large (>2 ha) 0.03 -0.00104 -0.0000812
(0.171) (0.00935) (0.000300)
Operational holdings (number) 1.90 0.0584 -0.00225
(2.068) (0.0997) (0.00320)
Taken any credit? (Yes = 1) 0.41 -0.00930 0.000157
(0.491) (0.0223) (0.000716)
Per capita daily food expenditure (INR) 10.80 0.872* -0.0161
(10.530) (0.490) (0.0157)
Dietary diversity score (0-15 scale) 10.27 0.0977 -0.00395
(2.232) (0.0968) (0.00311)
Share of grains from own sources (%) 37.48 0.566 -0.0626
(32.814) (1.581) (0.0507)
Share of grains from PDS (%) 23.21 -1.705 0.0312
(21.118) (1.087) (0.0349)
Share of grain from market (%) 38.50 0.707 0.0406
(31.140) (1.561) (0.0501)
Sold any grain in market? (Yes = 1) 0.17 0.00443 -0.000519
(0.379) (0.0184) (0.000589)
Observations 1429
F-test of joint significance 1.43 1.16
p-value 0.1139 0.2896
Notes: Column (1) presents the sample mean and standard deviation of the baseline
variables. Column (2) shows the coefficient and standard errors from an OLS regression
(separate regression for each row) of the baseline covariate on the indicator for whether
the individual qualified for hermetic bag purchase in the auction along with WTP and
village-level fixed effects. Column (3) presents the coefficients and standard errors on the
price drawn (price at which the qualified individuals purchase the bag) from a similar
regression. The bottom two rows in Columns (2) and (3) present the results of the F-test
for joint significance of all the baseline covariates on the qualification indicator and price










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 4.11: Cost Benefit Analysis of On-Farm Hermetic Storage Technology
For 50 kgs stored Traditional Improved
in one bag Storage Storage
If all If all If all If all








INR 10.85 INR 22 INR 12.02 INR 22
c. Total value (a * b) INR 488.25 INR 990 INR 601 INR 1100
d. Cost of storage bags INR 10 INR 10 INR 30 INR 30





- - INR 92.75 INR 90
Including potential aflatoxin control premium
g. Value per kg INR 10.85 INR 22 INR 12.51 INR 22
h. Total value (a * g) INR 488.25 INR 990 INR 625.50 INR 1100




- - INR 117.25 INR 90
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Table A.1: Awareness about contraceptive methods
Round 1 Round 2 Round 3
Aware of? Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban
(% reporting yes)
Female sterilization 99.3 99 99.4 99.3 99.3 99.6
Male sterilization 86.5 90.2 74.7 82.9 78.4 84
IUD/copper-t 62.2 77.4 59.6 76 65.6 82.3
Oral pill 59.3 74.4 60.2 75.5 68.3 82
ECP - - - - 35.6 48.7
Condom 42.8 57 43.4 62.8 52.7 73.2
Periodic Abstinence 38 52.7 31.5 37.9 35.2 45.9
Withdrawal 25.9 34.7 18.3 24.3 21.2 25.1
Observations 49415 18738 48581 27809 61811 26828
Notes: Table shows percentage of women in sample who responded yes when asked if they
were aware about each of the contraceptive methods. Note that awareness about ECPs
was not included in Round 1 and 2 of the DLHS survey.
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Table A.2: Difference in awareness about ECP between treatment and
control states DLHS Round 3
Aware of ECP = 1
Rural Urban
Non - TN 0.135*** 0.148***
(0.00) (0.01)
Individual and HH controls Y Y
Observations 61811 26828
Notes: Table shows percentage of women in sample who responded yes when asked if they
were aware about each of the contraceptive methods. Note that awareness about ECPs
was not included in Round 1 and 2 of the DLHS survey. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗
p < 0.01.
Table A.3: Test of common-trend assumption - border districts sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Condom Oral Periodic Withdrawal STI
pill Abstinence method
Non TN X -0.000537 0.00307 0.0205 0.0131 0.0151
Survey Round 2 (0.00403) (0.00162) (0.00956) (0.00866) (0.02290)
Observations 32190 32190 32190 32190 32190
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses and clustered at state level. Each column presents
the results from an OLS regression with a specification similar to that shown in Equa-
tion 2.1. The sample of observations is limited to the first two rounds of DLHS correspond-
ing to the pre-treatment period and to the border districts. All specifications include state





B.1 Information script for hermetic storage bag
auction
Thank you for giving me your valuable time today. As I mentioned when
we met you earlier we are part of a research project being carried out in
Bihar. As a part of this research we want to talk to you about grain storage
methods and provide information about a new kind of bag that can be used
to store grain. We also have a few bags with us and you will be given an
opportunity to buy some of these bags as a part of our research if you want to.
The price at which you will get this bag will be determined through a
particular process. Before giving you the opportunity to buy this bag, we
first want to tell you about the benefits of this bag.
You would have noticed that the jute or the plastic bags that are usually
used to store grain cannot prevent moisture from entering the grain from
the surrounding air. So even if you dry the grain well before storage, it will
pick up moisture during storage, particularly during the monsoon months.
When the grain gets moist it can lead to growth of fungus and mold as well
as insects and pests.
The hermetic bags that you see here store the grain under air-tight con-
ditions. That is - air from outside does not come in, nor air from inside go out.
(FI: Please show the sample bag to the farmer and explain how it is sealed)
As a result the grain that you store will continue to have the same level of
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moisture that was there at the start of storage even after a few months. By
controlling moisture any growth of fungus or pests will be stopped. Not only
that, even if there were any fungus or pests that were already in the grain
before storing these will also be killed due to lack of oxygen. Controlling
moisture and cutting off air supply will kill not just visible fungus and pests,
but also other kinds of fungus which cannot be seen by the eye, but will
damage the grain.
Therefore, storing grain in a hermetic bag ensures that you can sell even
after a few months, without having to worry about moisture content or dry-
ing it again before taking it to the trader. You also do not have to worry
about the grain that you stored for your own consumption getting spoilt due
to moisture, fungus or pest.
Once the bag is sealed you can open the seal to take out the grain you
need and reseal it but please do not do it too often. This is because we want
to maintain the air-sealed quality of the bag. It is recommended that you
open the bag as few times as possible for best performance of the bag. You
can also reuse these bags for storage again and again with proper care over
several seasons.
I also want to tell you about an important health benefit of using these stor-
age bags. The health benefit of this hermetic bags is that they also protect
your grain from mycotoxin or aflatoxin. Mycotoxin is a kind of fungus that
is not visible to the eye but is very harmful if consumed by humans. It has
many ill effects on health it causes digestive problems, vomiting, adversely
affect infants if consumed by pregnant women and may result in multiple
other ailments. It is also carcinogenic and can lead to some types of cancer.
Not only is mycotoxin invisible to the eye, it also cannot be removed once it
forms in the grain. So even if you have cleaned, converted to flour, boiled or
processed it, mycotoxin will still enter your body if the grain is contaminated.
By stopping airflow and any moisture from entering the hermetic bag can
reduce the growth rate of mycotoxin fungus. Please note that any mycotoxin
that has already developed will not go away but storing the grains in the bag
will retard their growth and spread.
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Another important health benefit of the hermetic bags is that you do not
need to add celphos to the grain. This has two advantages: first you do not
have to worry about children accidentally consuming the celphos or some of
the chemical getting into the grain you use for food. Celphos also reacts with
the moisture in the air to release phosphine gas. This kills insects and pests,
but is also very harmful if inhaled by humans.
B.2 BDM Auction Protocol
The auction methodology we use is known as the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak
(BDM) mechanism. Briefly, BDM mechanism operates as follows: After
providing information about the pros and cons of the storage technology
(hermetic bags), we ask an individual to state how much he or she is willing
to pay for a hermetic bag (their bid). Then a random price is drawn from a
range of prices. If the price drawn is lower or equal to the individuals bid,
then they get to buy the bag at the price that is drawn. If the price drawn
is higher than the individuals bid they will not qualify to buy the bag. The
exact steps that we will follow in implementing the BDM mechanism on the
field are described in detail in the next section.
Step 1: Information provision
Each field investigator (FI) meets one farmer individually at their home, and
first explains about the pros and cons of the hermetic bags. The information
provided will follow a specific script. It will describe what the technology is,
how it works, what it will protect against (pest, insect damage, and mold
growth) and what it cannot protect against (rodent, physical damage during
handling etc.). The FI will also inform the farmer that the market rate for
these kinds of bags is around Rupees 80. The farmer will be shown a sample
bag carried by the FI for this visit. He or she will be allowed to examine the
bag and the FI explains how it would be sealed in order to create a hermetic
condition for the grain inside.
The FIs will be trained on the information script as well as on the script
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for the rest of the steps in the auction in order to ensure that the informa-
tion given and the auction process followed is exactly identical for all farmers.
Once the FI has delivered the information, he will inform the farmer that
as a part of the research project the farmer is being offered the opportunity
to buy up to 5 bags. There is a possibility that he could get the bag at
a subsidized price, which can be much lower than the market price. The
final price at which he or she can get the bags will be determined through
a particular process. The FI will then ask if the farmer is interested in
participating in this process, and if yes, the FI will describe the auction
method to be used.
Step 2: Practice auction
After providing information about the bag and getting the farmers consent
to participate, the FI will tell the farmer that he will explain the method
to be followed by letting the farmer do a practice auction for two packs of
cookies.
The FI then shows the farmer two packs of cookies and gives the farmer
Rs. 10 to use in the practice auction. The FI then describes the process to
be followed verbally:
“Each pack of these cookies is usually sold for Rs. 5 in the market.
Today we are offering you the chance to buy it for a discounted
price. This price will be determined by a lottery (drawing a
coupon from a bag). Before that I will ask you a series of ques-
tions about how much you think this pack is worth to you, and
how much you are willing to pay for it based on your own taste
and preference for cookies. If you dont like these cookies at all,
you could think about how you would be willing to pay for it in
case you want to buy it for your wife, son or daughter or someone
else in your family. If none of them likes it, you can choose to
keep the Rs. 10 and not buy any pack of cookies.
I will ask you if you are willing to buy 1, 2 or no pack at various
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prices. I will start with asking you for Rs. 1 per pack. You will
think about if it is worth paying Rs 1 for this packet of cookies,
and how many would you want to buy at his price 0, 1 or 2. If
dont want it at all, you can say 0 right away for Rs 1, and I will
not ask you about further prices. Suppose you say that you will
buy 2 packets if the price is Rs. 1, then I will ask you how many
would you buy if it is offered at Rs. 2 per pack. Once again I
want you to think about how much it is worth to you, and tell me
if you would buy 0, 1 or 2 packets of cookies at Rs. 2. Suppose
you answered that you will buy 1 pack if the price is Rs. 2, I
will then ask you the same question for a higher price Rs. 3 and
suppose you said you will not buy any packs for Rs. 3. I will
not ask you any further questions and this will be the maximum
price you are willing to pay for the cookies.
Once you have given me your responses we will then decide the
price based on a lottery. This bag that I hold in front of you
contains five coupons. Each coupon is marked with one of the
numbers 1, 2, 3, 4 or 5. You will pull out a coupon from this
bag and the number that appears on it is going to be the price
of the cookie pack. Now, remember you said that Rs. 3 is the
maximum price you are willing to pay so if the coupon is of Rs.
4, you will not be able to buy any packs. However, if the coupon
you choose has a price of Rs. 3 or lower, you can buy it for the
lower price. If it is Rs. 2, you can buy 1 pack for Rs. 2 like you
wanted and if it is Rs. 1, you can buy 2 packs as you mentioned.
To summarize, you will qualify to purchase the cookies
only if the price drawn in coupon is less than or equal to
the maximum price that you are willing to pay.”
The FI then checks if the farmer has understood the auction. He will then
do a trial run of the cookies auction, without actual money:
“Now to make sure that you have understood this process we will
try it with the cookies first, but without actual money involved. I
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will ask you about how many packs you want to buy at different
prices. Please take your time to think about each price, and
provide an answer that reflects your liking. At whatever price
you finally get to buy or not buy, we want to be sure that you
are satisfied with your choices”.
The FI then asks the following questions:
After the farmer replies 0 at a price or reaches Rs. 5, the FI will let the
farmer pull out the coupon with the price on it. He will then explain to the
farmer what it implies: Whether the farmer will get to buy the cookies or
not? If yes, how many packs of cookies at what price per piece, and what is
the total money he would have had to pay? If no, the FI will explain that the
price turned out to be higher than what the farmer was willing to afford. The
FI reiterates that in either case we want you to be satisfied with your decision:
“I want to remind you that this is not about winning or losing
the game. We want you to be satisfied with the final outcome
and want it to reflect the true worth of the cookies to you.
We dont want you to say yes to a price higher than what you truly
feel this packet of cookies is worth. And if the coupon drawn is
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that higher price, we dont want you to feel unhappy about paying
this price because in reality you didnt feel that it was worth such
a high price.
Nor do we want you to say yes only to a very low price, and feel
regret when the price drawn turns out to be higher in which case
you will not get the cookies - because you actually wanted it even
at this higher price”.
The FI checks if the farmer has any questions. If there are none, he
continues:
“Now that you have seen how this works, in order to make sure
there is no confusion we will now repeat this auction with the
cookies - but this time you will use the Rs. 10 we gave you. You
will play this game with this Rs. 10 as if it is yours. Please
think carefully about your responses. This time at the end of the
auction if you qualify to buy the cookies, then you will have to
actually pay the money from this Rs. 10 and buy the cookies at
the price decided by the coupon”
The FI then carries out the auction for the cookies using actual money
this time (see next page). He once again lets the farmer pull out the coupon
with the price at the end of the auction. Based on the farmers responses
and the price drawn, if the farmer qualifies to make the purchase, the FI will
inform him accordingly. He will explain to the farmer how much money he
will have to pay to the FI, and reiterate that he cannot back out now from
the purchase. Conversely, if the farmer does not qualify to buy the cookies,
the FI explains to him why it is the case.
The FI will ask the farmer, in either case, if he is satisfied with the outcome.
If the farmer is not clear about the process, the FI says that:
“I can repeat the game again, and you can tell me you responses
again. I want to be sure that you understand it clearly because
we will follow a similar procedure for the bags as well. But, I am
allowed to do the auction for the bags only once, and will not be
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able to repeat it. So we want to be sure that you are clear about
the process and are comfortable with it before we go ahead”.
Step 3: Auction for hermetic storage bags
The FI checks if the farmer has correctly understood the process, and ensures
there is no confusion. Once it is clear that the farmer understands the pro-
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cess, the FI then tells him that now we will do the auction with the hermetic
bags:
“We will now follow the same kind of steps for the hermetic bag
as well in order to give you the opportunity to purchase the tech-
nology possibly at a lower than market price. Just like we had a
maximum of 2 packets of cookies to offer to you, we now have a
maximum of 5 bags that you can buy. So for each price in our
list we will ask you if you want to buy 0, 1, 2, 3, 4 or 5 bags.
Remember that the market price for these types of bags is Rs.
85 in Patna. The price we will draw from the coupons will lie
between Rs.10 to Rs. 90 per bag.
Please make sure you think carefully about your responses to each
price. Just as we did with the cookies if you win the chance to
buy the bag at a lower price, you will then have to buy it. Once
you get the bags our team member will show you how to store
the grain in the bag and seal it. You will also have our contact
information and will be able to call us anytime.
We will do this only once, and we cannot repeat it again. Once
the decision has been reached at the end of the process, we will
have to stick to it. You will not be given a chance to change your
mind, nor can I bend the rules that I have to follow. Please keep
these things in mind when you make your choices.
Before we start do you have any other questions about the bags?
Would like to take a look at it once again? Do you have any
questions about the process that we will follow now?”
If the farmer has no further questions and agrees to proceed the FI will
start the auction for the hermetic bags:
Once the price and quantity of bags has been set, the FI will deliver the
bags and farmer will have to make the payment. He then informs the farmer
that a member of the team will visit the village on a regular basis. They will
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check if the farmer is facing any problems with the bag and help solve an
issues that arise. He will also gather additional information form the farmer





Figure C.1: Project Area
112
